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Significance of the Study 
For centuries, humankind has had an innate desire to order and com-
prehend its environment. This desire for knowledge has stimulated the 
minds of scholars towards providing answers to the myriad questions con-
cerning the universe. Through ideas, which are created by humans, indi-
vidual societies and their scholars have pursued the order and ultimate 
comprehension of nature. This same desire for order and understanding 
exists in the field of curriculum. Curriculum theorists have, therefore, 
augmented their own ideas by borrowing ideas from other disciplines in an 
effort to bring insight into curriculum theory (Dobson and Dobson, 1987). 
Historically, curriculum studies have borrowed heavily from the 
field of science; thus, science has provided the template through which 
ideas concerning curriculum have been developed (Doll, 1989). Spencer's 
search in 1880 for the knowledge that was of most worth marked the be-
ginning of this scientific influence upon the field of curriculum. Once 
Spencer opened the door of curriculum theory to scientific methods, other 
curriculum theorists followed suit. Theorists such as Bobbitt and Char-
ters discovered many areas in curriculum in which scientific methods were 
applicable. 
As curriculum theorists began to apply scientific concepts and ter-
minology to curriculum, the nomenclature no longer was used merely to 
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describe a concept or methodology, but in time, began to describe 11 real-
ity11 in schools. This originally borrowed descriptive language thus 
transcended its initial purpose and evolved into a definition or descrip-
tion of rea 1 ity. Consequently, as this applies to education, 11 Language, 
which is intended to explain or describe reality, becomes reality 11 (Dob-
son and Dobson, n.d., p. 4). 
In an effort to understand curriculum theory, it behooves one to 
understand the scientific methods that have been borrowed to formulate 
the concepts in curriculum theory. Scientists realize that their theo-
ries determine or mold what they see. Does it not hold true then, that 
the concepts used to structure curriculum theory determine what wi 11 
become reality in education? Palmer (1987, p. 16) stressed, 11 ••• the 
way we know has powerful implications for the way we 1 ive. 11 He further 
implied that the epistemology will, in time, evolve into an ethic. If 
this is true, then the dominant scientific methods of a culture can offer 
tremendous insight into curriculum theory. 
The scientific world that curriculum reformers of the early twen-
tieth century (Bobbitt, Charters, Huxley, Spencer) mirrored has become 
known as "classical science," which rested upon the knowledge gained and 
research techniques employed by scientists such as Galileo, Descartes, 
and Newton. Their knowledge base was centered around a reductioni st 
frame of reference (i.e., the breakdown of wholes into their most elemen-
tary parts) and therefore produced a mechanical world. This reductionist 
mentality allowed scientists to assume that the whole was no more than 
the sum of the individual parts and if one could understand the causal 
relationship between the parts, the whole could be reconstructed. Such 
a mechanical concept not only gave scientists insight into the under-
standing of whole entities, but also provided them the means to make 
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predictions concerning future behavior. These scientists of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries refashioned the scientific community 
with the discovery that the earth was not the center of the universe, and 
with the concept that material and matter consisted of a multitude of 
basic, tiny objects which could be variously assembled into different and 
larger structures. 
These scientific discoveries created an objective reality in which 
the observers were segregated from their environments and could therefore 
observe and comprehend that environment in its entirety. It allowed for 
no interaction or modification resulting from the presence of the indi-
vidual. This reality also utilized the Cartesian method of analysis, 
which required breaking down the whole and then arranging the elements 
according to causal law. Consequently, reality became predictable and 
deterministic. Ga 1 i 1 eo, Descartes. and Newton henceforth began to de-
scribe the world and its entities in terms of a machine and this world-
machine concept became the dominating metaphor of the time. It was 
because of these principles that science and society began thinking in 
terms of absolute truths. 
Just as classical scientists sought to understand nature by breaking 
down whole entities, so too did curriculum reformers seek to understand 
the schooling process by analyzing the various components and their rela-
tionships that constitute school. Curriculum was perceived as a series 
of predetermined objectives that students work towards through specified 
learning objectives. These objectives provided the route by which stu-
dents obtained knowledge that had been deemed most important. 
The student body was also broken down into age groups and, in many 
cases, these age groups were subsequently divided according to ability. 
Consequently, whether it be by the breakdown of curriculum and/or the 
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student body, through Cartesian style analysis, educational reformers set 
out to improve the schooling process and curriculum through scientific 
means. These early curriculum theorists proved that the principles of 
science were indeed applicable to curriculum theory. 
If the scientific world has provided the foundation on which many 
seeming 11 truths 11 have been grounded, then any major shift in that disci-
pline will invariably have a ripple affect on other elements of society, 
including the field of curriculum. As knowledge has expanded over time, 
scientific theories have disintegrated and have given rise to new theo-
ries. Once a community accepts a given accumulation of theories and then 
begins translating reality in light of those theories, the community is 
said to be functioning under a specific paradigm. Kuhn (1970b, p. 103) 
defined a paradigm as, 11 ••• the source of the methods, problem-field, 
and standard of solution accepted by any mature scientific community at 
any given time. 11 Capra (1984, p. 22} expanded this definition to in-
clude, 11 ••• the totality of thought, perceptions, and values that forms 
a particular vision that is the basis of the way society organizes it-
self . 11 Either definition of paradigm has tremendous meaning for the 
field of science and society. 
Pagels (1988) and Kuhn (1970b) pointed out that paradigms cease to 
function when the established theories can no longer explain or describe 
existing universal entities. When a paradigm begins to experience ano-
malies, scientists will seek to explain their knowledge through various 
methods (i.e., new mathematical formulas and/or new technology) and thus 
pioneer new theories. These new theories will not only explain the ano-
malies, but will also require a reinterpretation of reality. Kuhn 
(1970b} stated that 
Scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense ••• 
that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in 
the exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm 
itself had previously led the way (p. 91). 
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This statement describes what transpired in the field of physics at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
The theories resulting from classical science began to break down 
when scientists of the early 1900 1 s discovered that the elementary ele-
ments of classical science could be reduced to their subatomic levels. 
Scientists soon discovered also that these subatomic elements could not 
be retained as isolated entities separated from the whole, which had been 
the foundation of classical science. These discoveries, which came about 
in piecemeal fashion, marked the beginning of a new paradigm. 
Again, if science holds any truth for curriculum, then the scien-
tific principles that emerge out of a new paradigm must be understood in 
order to understand curriculum. Einstein, Heisenburg, and Bohr have 
emerged as major contributors to these new scientific theories. Because 
of their contributions, not only the field of science, but all of society 
is being forced to redefine reality. 
The theories of Einstein, Heisenburg, and Bohr contributed to what 
has become known as quantum mechanics. However, even though these three 
scientists could agree on basic scientific principles, the question: 11 1S 
there an ultimate reality that exists outs.ide of observation? 11 caused a 
major split in the philosophies of these men. The entailing argument, 
which lasted until Einstein•s death, centered around what was known as 
the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. 
The foundation of the Copenhagen Interpretation was Heisenburg • s 
principle of uncertainty and Bohr•s principle of complimentarity. Out of 
these two principles, nature was perceived in random terms; consequently, 
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the behavior of individual parts of nature could only be described 
through statistics. The real problem in attempting to describe nature 
was the impact of the observer upon the observed, for if the mere pres-
ence of an individual altered motion that was already random, how could 
science ever expect to fully comprehend the ultimate character of nature? 
Heisenburg and Bohr's response to this question became the basic tenets 
of the Copenhagen Interpretation. 
Einstein, though a contributor to quantum mechanics, could never 
accept this interpretation of quantum mechanics. He could not support 
the principle that nature was totally random and was forever uncomfor-
tab 1 e with the indeterminacy that emerged from Bohr and He i sen burg • s 
principles. He was convinced that there must be an underlying objective 
or cause that worked to interconnect natural phenomena. Therefore, he 
spent the rest of his 1 ife searching for a unifying theory that would 
restore order to nature. 
Regardless of the conflict that erupted over this interpretation of 
reality, Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenburg contributed to a new way of view-
ing reality and gave new value to the role of the observer. Pagels 
(1988, p. 88), in his studies of scientific theories and reality, posed 
the questions, 11 Why do we model reality and represent it as a myth, meta-
phor, or scientific theory? 11 and 11 Why does our mind recast its own expe-
rience in terms of symbols, symbols whose meaning we often do not under-
stand ourselves? 11 His response to these questions first centers around 
the uniqueness of the human species and the ability to create and use 
various symbols. Secondly, the ability to represent, simulate and de-
scribe through the use of symbols, gives individuals the feeling of au-
tonomy over their own experiences. Scientific theories thus become 
society's way of ordering reality as perceived by our minds and is, to 
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some degree, reflective of a culture. Apple (1975, p. 123) observed 
that, "Scientific outlooks have become so ingrained in our consciousness 
that they have become values, not merely ways of gaining knowledge... If 
this is true, then one must assume that scientific theories form the 
bedrock on which a society is built. 
When witnessing the disintegration of scientific theories and the 
rise of new theories, one must question the effect of these changes upon 
a society. Were Newton and the other scientists of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries wrong in their theories, therein creating a para-
digm that was misleading society? Kuhn (cited in Regis, 1987) was forced 
to address this same quest ion wherein he deve 1 oped the concept of "para-
digm shock. 11 He began to question the rightness of Aristotle 1s Physics 
in terms of twentieth century knowledge. His understanding of Aristot-
le1s work came only after he attempted to view the universe from Aristot-
le1s knowledge base. Kuhn came to realize that Aristotle functioned from 
a paradigm in which place, purpose, and shape comprised the primary real-
ity. Consequently, working within the given knowledge and with the use 
of current technology, one cannot say Aristotle was wrong, or that Newton 
was wrong. According to the definition of 11 domain of validity." all 
knowledge can be considered true within the limits of its domain. There-
fore, within the confines of their knowledge, these scientists were able 
to interpret reality. New paradigms thus allow scientists, and conse-
quently society, to redefine reality because of expanded knowledge and. 
by borrowing the resulting scientific methods, curriculum theorists are 
able to find alternative ways of dealing with curriculum theory. 
Assumption of the Study 
To provide a ground work for the current study and to 1 imit the 
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otherwise boundless directions that study could pursue, the following 
basic assumptions were made: 
1. Language is humankind•s way of describing and communicating 
reality. 
2. The field of science has been the primary source of concepts and 
language that curriculum theorists use in understanding reality. 
3. Terminology and concepts used to describe reality, thus become 
reality. 
4. If science has been the foundation for knowledge and understand-
ing of reality, then any major shift in that knowledge and understanding 
will undoubtedly have an affect upon other elements of society, including 
curriculum thought. 
5. Knowing/learning is no longer viewed as a linear progression 
built upon previously learned facts in a sequential fashion, but rather 
must be approached in a wholistic fashion. 
Purpose and Organization of the Study 
If paradigms are the source of perceptions and values associated 
with a particular culture, then it follows that the understanding of a 
particular scientific paradigm could offer insight into a new way of 
viewing curriculum. Since the Copenhagen Interpretation forced science 
to reinterpret reality, it is possible that the scientific principles 
associated with this paradigm could also provide an alternative means for 
curriculum theorizing. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to in-
vestigate the primary components of the Copenhagen Interpretation and 
then determine their possible relevance for curriculum theory. 
Chapter II of this study addresses what has been termed as 11 C 1 as-
sical science, 11 or the 11old paradigm. 11 Findings that resulted from 
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observation and applied logic led scientists of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries to perceive the universe as a mechanical world or 
machine that could be reduced to its most elementary parts and then re-
constructed in an orderly and predictable fashion. These findings were 
substantiated mathematically, and were therefore accepted by scientists 
and the rest of society because they provided acceptable answers to the 
workings of the universe. The works of Galilee, Descartes, and Newton 
were reviewed in depth. In an effort to illustrate the affect of clas-
sical science upon twentieth century curriculum, a brief comparison was 
made between the basic principles of classical science and Tyler (1949), 
whose work with curriculum has become the foundation of most public 
schoo 1 s today. 
Chapter I II de a 1 s with the controversy surrounding the Copenhagen 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The major leaders in this discus-
sion included Heisenburg and Bohr, who supported the concept of discon-
tinui sm {def: once motion is observed, it thus becomes discontinuous), 
and Einstein, who fully supported the concept of continuous motion. The 
result of this debate was an admission by scientists that 
A complete understanding of reality was beyond the capacity of 
rational thought. In other words, physicists could forever 
mull over ideas about the nature of reality, but would never be 
able to consider the nature of reality itself (Weaver, 1987, p. 
397). 
Resultant from this intense discussion was a reality created by obser-
vation rather than an existence that followed a hidden order. 
Chapter IV of this study focuses on the concept of a changing or 
emerging reality. If one views reality as being constantly in a state or 
process, then one must address the elements or components of that reality 
in order to comprehend its entirety or wholeness. Authors such as 
Whitehead, Capra, and Wharf identified those components of reality as 
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experience, perceptions, the mind, and consciousness; therefore, these 
concepts are discussed in depth. Another extremely important ingredient 
in the process of an emerging reality is that of the human entity. 
Jantsch's (1975) work was explored, in which he utilized the perception 
of an observer and a stream to create a metaphor that demonstrates the 
role and importance of the human entity in creating reality. 
Chapter V addressed the ontological meaning of the Copenhagen Inter-
pretation specifically for schools and curriculum. This section 
attempted to address the question: "Does an emerging paradigm offer the 
potential of an alternative conceptual base for reinterpreting the 
schooling process?" 
CHAPTER II 
CLASSICAL SCIENCE: ITS FOUNDATION AND AFFECTS 
UPON CURRICULUM THOUGHT 
Introduction 
Scientific theories and discoveries before the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries (or before the use of technology) were based upon obser-
vation and logic. Because of this method of gathering data, scientists 
began logically to conclude that the earth was the center of the universe 
and that celestial bodies such as the moon, sun, and stars followed an 
elliptical course around the earth. Through the use of conmon sense, 
scientists were able to rationalize that the sun must orbit the earth 
since they observed that the sun rose in the morning and set at 
nightfall. 
This same common sense, which grew out of observation, allowed these 
scientists/scholars to hypothesize not only the structural content of 
these heavenly bodies, but also the construct of the entire cosmos. They 
concluded that stars, which were formed from some imperishable celestial 
fire, were arrayed throughout the universe. The universe itself was 
perceived to be a great sphere, which appeared to be smooth and trans-
parent as glass. Since the stars and planets could be observed moving 
individually, scientists concluded that there must be a series of spheres 
arranged one inside the other, each capable of supporting its own 
11 
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heavenly bodies. These conclusions thus provided the foundation on which 
many scientific theories were built. 
Many of the ideas that led to these early theories were derived from 
the philosophies and concepts of Aristotle, who applied his reasoning 
powers to' nature. These concepts or beliefs were accepted without ex-
perimental proof; they appeared to explain accurately the workings of the 
universe, and were therefore deemed substantiated through observation and 
logic. 
Aristotle's World 
Aristotle's teachings established the premise that the earth and the 
surrounding universe was composed of opposing and irreconcilable realms 
and also provided insight into the relationship between the human race 
and nature. This early society came to believe that the purpose of na-
ture was to serve the needs of society, and therefore to help perpetuate 
their destiny. This concept, belief, or perception was substantiated in 
Greek philosophy and Judea-Christian theology and, as a result, filtered 
into the field of physics. Because these philosophies, which transcended 
into scientific theories, provided logical explanations that could be 
visualized {which was the only experimental tool available), they were 
accepted as truth. Therefore, this knowledge base provided answers for 
science and society concerning the order and purpose of nature in rela-
tion to the needs of human beings. 
Galilee {1564-1642) 
Galilee was the first to challenge successfully the scientific con-
cepts of Aristotle. Galilee, along with other scientists such as Newton, 
Kepler, and Descartes, did not abandon the "tools" employed by scientific 
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predecessors (e.g., observation and logic), but it was through observa-
tion and logic (aided by then-new technology) that they began to realize 
that natural phenomena obeyed or could be explained through mathematical 
principles. With this realization, scientists began to paint a new pic-
ture of nature, the human race, and the relationship that existed between 
all. This new reality persisted until it too had been challenged by 
scientists with newer principles of mathematics and more accurate and 
precise technology. 
For example, by employing the principles of geometry, scientists of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were able to give new meaning to 
their observations of the universe. Until the time of Galilee, astronomy 
was considered to be a branch of mathematics, i.e., of geometry. It was 
considered the geometry of the heavens, since astronomers could observe a 
regularity in changing relationships between the point of observation and 
the heavenly bodies being observed. Because there was no viable opposi-
tion to this concept, astronomers concluded that the earth must be a 
sphere and thus was a reference point from which all other observations 
were measured. Ga 1 i 1 eo compared this corre 1 at ion between geometry and 
the heavens to a book. He felt that, unless one understood the language 
and symbols in which the book was written, one could never hope to com-
prehend its secrets. To Galilee, the language of the universe was mathe-
matical and the symbols were represented as triangles, circles, and other 
geometrical figures. 
Galilee was continually amazed at the correspondence between his 
observations of the universe and their ability to follow the principles 
of geometry. Therefore, he felt that it must be mathematics that held 
the key to understanding nature and the universe, and that logic provided 
the vehicle for criticism. Logic allowed scientists to determine the 
14 
consistency of theories, yet that same logic could not lead to the dis-
covery of those theories. Scientific theories were discovered through 
the application of mathematics. 
As a result of applying mathematical principals to observations, 
Galilee began to perceive the world, which he espoused as being made by 
God, a~ an unchanging mathematical system which could produce absolute 
certainty of scientific knowledge. This 11 mathematical system 11 was per-
ceived as being orderly and simple; every movement was regular and ne-
cessary. In a letter written to the Grand Duchess Christ ina in 1615, 
Galilee stated that, 11 Nature is inexorable, acts only through inmutable 
laws which she never transgresses, and cares nothing whether her reasons 
and methods of operating be or be not understood able by men 11 (cited in 
Burtt, 1949, p. 64). Galilee concluded that this orderly and simple uni-
verse consisted of mass, motion, and weight, whose interrelatedness could 
be explained through causal relationships. He further concluded that 
truth or ultimate knowledge of the universe could only be achieved 
through mathematical interpretation. Galilee's views of the universe 
were founded upon visual observation, experimentation, and principles of 
mathematics. 
If Galilee experienced any success in challenging the world as de-
scribed by Aristotle, it was due to the fact that Gal ileo's discoveries 
and theories were not only verifiable mathematically, but were also ac-
ceptable to the senses of his peers. He was basically attempting to 
challenge a reality that made sense to people through logical observa-




Like Galilee, Descartes also contributed to this changing reality by 
expanding the use of mathematics into physics. Descartes attempted to 
reducg_everything to the rearrangement of particles which moved acc~rding 
to the laws of mechanics! This, in turn, intensified his curiosity about 
causality or the original source of beings and provided him with another 
avenue of knowledge to explore. Descartes• insight into causality is 
best reflected in a statement he made after much pondering and observa-
tion, 11 Cogito ergo cum 11 ( 11 I think, therefore I am 11 ). Descartes therefore 
concluded that his own existence was not self-derived, but derived from 
the ultimate cause of everything: God. 
In his search for the ultimate causation of nature, Descartes in-
vented analytical geometry, which allowed him to make two major contribu-
tions to this new mathematical reality._ First, he developed a hypothesis 
which explained the mathematical structu-r:e .. and operations of the uni-
verse. Second, Descartes attempted to justify the exclusion of humans 
and their interest from nature. As a result of these mathematical 
findings, Descartes believed that the world could be divided into two 
exclusive and exhaustive realms: thought and motion, which became his 
metaphysical dualism. Given this analysis, it was now up to science to 
determine or ·deduce the causes of everything from these two basic 
principles. 
Descartes• use of analytical geometry allowed one to show an exact 
one-to-one correspondence between the nature of numbers; i.e., space. 
Even though this relationship was not foreign to the field of mathemat-
ics, it was intuition that enabled Descartes to comprehend the absolute 
correspondence in their relationship. Descartes expanded this concept 
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and began to believe that this correspondence between nature and mathe-
matics not only applied to the observable world, but would most certainly 
· be applicable to the entire field of physics. This discovery took 
Descartes back to the question of causality. which once again he felt 
could be explained mathematically. 
In working with the concept of causa.l.ity,.,,Descartes became the first. 
scientist to explain the solar system in mechanical terms. Mechanical 
' . 
terms meant that the universe consisted of individual parts which were 
all interrelated through causal relationships and consequently worked in 
harmony with each other to produce an ordered universe. Descartes saw 
the individual bodies of the universe as being in various stages of mo-
tion which could be defined through mathematical deduction. Thus, ac-
cording to Descartes. extension and motion (the two basic natures of an 
object) were mathematically reducible. He further believed that the 
specific features of extension {dimension, unity, and figure) could be 
explained through the use of simple arithmetic or geometry. In an effort 
to explain the onset and continuation of motion, Descartes purported that 
God set entities into motion and they remained in motion because of the 
basic nature and will of God. This principle satisfied Descartes• search 
for the origin of motion and, consequently, made motion just as natural 
to a body as rest. 
Descartes• perceptions of motion and its relationship to extended 
bodies provided him the framework through which he was able to describe 
the world as 11 extended bodies, 11 existing since creation. These assump-
tions further allowed Descartes to compare the workings of the universe 
to that of a large machine. In this machine there was no spontaneity at 
any point; all bodies continued to move in accordance with the principles 
of extension and motion. Consequently, the universe had to be perceived 
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as an extended plenum (filled with matter, all of the same kind, and all 
in motion), and the motion, of whose several parts are connected to each 
other by immediate impact, all happens with the regularity, precision, 
and inevitabi 1 ity of a machine. These scientific concepts, espoused by 
Descartes, described a world that was essentially mechanistic, and since 
the 1 aws of mechanics corresponded to the 1 aws of nature, entities in 
nature could be reduced to their elementary parts and reconstructed ac-
cording to mechanical laws. 
Newton (1642-1721) 
Kuhn (1970b) stated that scientific theories are many times con-
structed in piecemeal fashion and an individual theory or finding ac-
credited to one scientist is the summation and/or refinement of many 
theories. Such is the case with Newton. Newton was able to build upon 
the works of Galilee and Descartes, and draw conclusions that expanded 
and broadened their earlier findings dea 1 i ng with the nature of the 
universe. 
Like Descartes, Newton was very intrigued by the concept of motion. 
In his book, Principia (val. I), Newton outlined three axioms or laws of 
motion which have maintained credibility through the twentieth century: 
1. Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform 
motion in a right light, unless it is compelled to change 
that state by forces impressed upon it. 
2. The change of motion is proportional to the motive force 
impressed, and is made in the direction of the right line 
in which the force is pressed. 
3. To every thing there is always opposed and equal reaction 
(p. 13). 
The third law of motion allowed Newton to demonstrate the equality 
of action and reaction. To test this concept, Newton suspended two balls 
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and then attempted to measure the results of their collisions. He 
discovered that upon impact, the effect upon each ball was an equivalent 
amount; thus, the action and reaction were equal. Newton further con-
cluded that laws applying to greater motion must also hold true for les-
ser motions. For example, if heavenly bodies are controlled by the 
forces of larger bodies; then consequently, bodies of lesser motions 
should also be controlled by lesser forces. As a result of these two 
principles, Newton was able to establish a sense of continuity and order, 
both to heavenly motion and earthly motion. 
Another are&.Jn which Newton had tremendous insight was in the area 
of time and space. According to Newton•s theories, space was not objec-
tive (as perceived by Aristotle), but was dependent upon the observer•s 
motion. What was the objective element in reality was 11 time space. 11 
Newton was very much aware that space and time could not have completely 
separate identities because there was no way to indicate meaningfully a 
change in time at any point in space. Observers moving separately would 
not only have different coordinates assigned to a given point in space, 
they would not even be able to agree on the identity point in space. 
Because Newton assumed that space was 11 flat, 11 he was able to explain the 
concept of relative space-time through Euclidean geometry (plane 
geometry). 
Newton was not only interested in motion and relative time space; he 
also showed significant interest in the concept of causality. Earlier, 
Descartes had explained that the self-derived existence of God was being 
the ultimate cause of all things. Newton, however, began to expand this 
ide a 1 , and even though he uti 1 i zed causa 1 1 anguage, he introduced an 
important qualification: the cause of certain entities is not derived 
from a power or 11 excellence, 11 but rather is derived from the uniqueness 
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of their nature. Newton differed from Descartes in that Newton did not 
believe that God was literally the cause of himself or that valleys were 
the result of mountains, but rather, these entities existed because it 
was characteristic of their nature to exist. As summarized by Newton, 
11 An immediate cause and effect must be in the same time and therefore, 
the preexistence of a thing can be no cause of its past existence {also 
because the after time does not depend on the former time 11 ) {cited in 
McGuire and Tamny, 1983, p. 138). Newton, while working with the princi-
ple of causality, identified the principle of uniformity. This new prin-
ciple stated that in determining a natural effect, one must identify the 
same cause. Consequently, Newton removed the ultimate cause of entities 
from a supreme being or outside force and postulated that entities, in-
cluding a supreme being, existed as a result of natural characteristics. 
He also was able to show consistency in causal relationships by declaring 
that identical effects must be a product of the same cause. 
The linchpin of Newton•s insights into motion, time space, and cau-
sality was the use of a precise language which described mathematical 
relationships. This description made possible the systematic analysis of 
motion and the ability to predict future behavior of all celestial bod-
ies. Through this mathematical approach, Newton was able to explain not 
only the orbits of planets, but also the irregular motion of the moon, 
the paths of comets. and the ebb and flow of the tides. In an effort to 
explain and fully comprehend these natural phenomena, he began comparing 
the universe to a very large watchspring which had been wound up by God 
and then left to 11 run down 11 systematically on its own. Assuming that the 
universe did follow orderly (and therefore predictable) laws, it became 
the task of Newton to discover these laws, or at least provide the con-
struct from which to explain the workings of the universe. 
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Newton's laws of nature not only served his generation, but gave 
insight into future scientific theories. For example, he anticipated the 
concept of transformation, which is the idea that particles can be cre-
ated and destroyed. This concept was also an expansion of Descartes• 
earlier findings whereby he attempted mathematically to reduce bodies 
down to their rearrangements of particles. Newton, however, while ex-
ploring the principles of light, began to realize that light could be 
made to disappear; thus, instead of particles· becoming rearranged they 
merely vanished. Also, while working with light, Newton questioned 
whether light was a particle or a wave. Though two centuries before the 
advent of quantum mechanics, he eventually embraced the particle theory, 
even though his findings concerning light were the foundations of the 
wave theory. 
Newton's theories revolutionized the field of science. It was 
through his theories that the scientific community was able to understand 
not only the universe but also the world that surrounded them. This new-
found knowledge allowed scientists to perceive an existing order and 
unity in both spheres of reality. Because of the methods used by Newton 
to develop his theories, he ushered in the Age of Reason. Scholars now 
expected to be able to solve most problems by accepting a few axioms 
which had been worked out through observations and then carefully sub-
stantiated and explained through mathematical principles. 
Summary of Classical Science 
The reality described by Galilee, Descartes, and Newton was much 
different from that which had been seen by Aristotle. Aristotle saw a 
universe whose every movement was controlled by supernatural beings. 
Humankind was the center of this universe and was held in such esteem 
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that the functions of the universe were there to serve the human race. 
Even though Galilee, Descartes, and Newton described a different reality, 
this is not to say that Aristotle was wrong in his basic principles; he 
is a celebrated and very respected scholar. However, given the 11 tools 11 
of the period (observation and logic), one can at least understand the 
rationale behind his subsequently disproven conclusions, which appeared 
very accurate and thus able to answer satisfactorily questions concerning 
the universe. 
However, tools become antiquated as newer tools are developed, which 
allow scientists/scholars to draw more accurate or different conclusions. 
Such was the case with the new generation of scientists. They did not 
put aside the 11 0ld 11 tools of Aristotle, for Galilee, Descartes, and New-
ton all observed and came to logical conclusions, but their data were the 
results of not only the 11 0lder 11 tools of logic and empirical knowledge, 
but also the newer and more precise tools such as geometry and calculus. 
Thus, the reality seen by these scholars was very different than that 
seen by Aristotle. 
With the discovery that mathematical principles of the time (Euclid-
ian geometry) could be applied to the workings of the universe, both 
celestial and terrestrial, scientists were now beginning to have an un-
derstanding of the workings of the cosmos. They were now able to expand 
their understanding of motion and original causation and, as a result, 
gain a clearer understanding of these observable and predictable phenom-
ena. The fact that scientists could now mathematically predict planetary 
movement forced them to question or reevaluate the role of God. Though 
never questioning the existence of God or a supreme power, Newton rede-
fined the function of God. Instead of God being in direct control of 
every specific movement of the universe, Newton maintained that once 
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heavenly bodies were set into motion, God then allowed them to 11 run 
down, 11 or function, on their own power; thus, the universe was predict-
able and consistent {like the workings of a machine or of a great clock). 
Descartes contributed to this new understanding with his statement of the 
vortex theory. Through this theory, Descartes was able to explain plane-
tary orbits which, in turn, regulated God to the. position of the perpetu-
ator of motion. Given the origin of motion, the natural happenings of 
the universe then continued in regular revolutions as found in a mechani-
cal machine. The term or concept of 11 clock 11 to these scientists sullllloned 
up the image of a great cathedral clock. These massive clocks were 
powered by their descending weights, thus moving the hands which turned 
by their axles. Not only did the term 11 Clock 11 refer to this enormous 
time piece, but also to everything associated with it. 
Mechanical men rang bells. Saints appeared through the doors. 
Cocks crowed to tell the hour. One complex mechanism generated 
a multiplicity of operations that suggested the infinite phe-
nomena of the infinitely complex machine we call nature, except 
that the cosmic clock made by the divine watchmaker required no 
winding up. The conservation of the total quantity of motion, 
and principles of inertia on which it rested, insured its eter-
nal operation {Westfall, 1980, p. 15). 
This new generation of scientists brought a sense of order to the 
universe. An order that was mathematical, accurate, and precise. That 
is not to say that science had all of the answers to the workings of the 
universe. Though Newton and Descartes disagreed on many areas, both 
sought answers to the same questions. Bernard le Bovier de Fontenello {a 
French writer and amateur scientist) stated, upon the death of Newton, 
11 [Descartes] set out from what he knew clearly in order to find the cause 
of what he saw. The other [Newton] set out from what he saw in order to 
find the cause 11 {cited in Crombie, 1959, p. 166). Even though Galilee, 
Descartes, and Newton used various methodologies and took differing 
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points of view concerning reality, these scientists of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries answered enough questions with a good deal of accu-
racy to bring credibility to their reality. This reality or world was a 
••• quantitative world instead of the quq.JUatJve world of 
daily experience, mechanistic instead of organic, indefinite in 
extent instead of finite, an alien world frightening to many 
but in its challenge, thrilling to some {Westfall, 1980, p. 1). 
This new reality thus required a new language that could adequately de-
scribe what was transpiring in nature. With geometry, algebra, and cal-
culus forming the foundation of this revolutionary knowledge, reality 
could now be described in terms of causality, reduction, precision, and 
predictability. 
Galilee, Descartes, and Newton were on the cutting edge of a new 
paradigm. In the study of paradigms, Kuhn (1970b) stated that 
Scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense 
that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in 
the exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm 
itself had previously led the way (p. 91). 
The anomalies that arose from the old paradigm (Aristotle• s theories) 
gave these scientists the opportunity to explore new knowledge and the 
technological advancements of the period, coupled with the new mathemati-
cal tools, provided the vehicle for the exploration. 
Classical Science: Foundation of the Tyler Model 
When Aristotle•s theories could no longer serve their purpose for 
society, science then was forced to seek new theories which did provide 
viable answers to questions concerning the universe. Such was the case 
in education at the beginning of the twentieth century. The educational 
system could no longer meet the demand to educate the large populace of 
students entering the schools as a result of immigration. Therefore, 
alternative methods were required if schools were to accoRillodate the 
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special needs of immigrant children, and yet maintain a high level of 
education for other students. As stated in Chapter I, Huxley, Spencer, 
Bobbitt, and Charters authored reforms that not only made schoo 1 s more 
efficient, but also modernized the curriculum to meet the needs of a 
twentieth century society. 
Both Bobbitt and Charters taught at the University of Chicago while 
Ralph Tylet., was attending graduate school, and when considering that 
Tyler was the graduate assistant of Charters, it is little wonder that 
one can see the influence of both of these men in the works of Tyler. In 
Tyler•s (1949) book, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction, he 
outlined steps in developing curriculum that, over time, have become so 
accepted in education that they have, 11 • been raised almost to the 
status of revered doctrine 11 (Kliebard, 1975, p. 70). 
Tyler (1949) felt that the foundation of curriculum should be built 
around four basic questions: 
1. What educational purposes should the school seek to attain? 
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are 
likely to attain these purposes? 
3. How can these educational purposes be effectively 
organized? 
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being 
attained? (pp. 1-2). 
In summary, the Tyler model consisted of stated objectives, selecting 
specific activities that led students through organized experiences and 
then provided evaluation as to the successful completion of the 
objectives. 
First, in developing objectives, one draws from the learner, soci-
ety, and subject matter. In addressing the 1 earner, one acquires data 
through the use of interviews, observations, tests, and questionnaires. 
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Like Bobbitt, Tyler (1949) felt that society should be divided into spe-
cific categories such as religion, vocation, recreation, etc., and then 
objectives should be developed that are relevant to each. Objectives 
dealing with subject matter are based on required content and skill. 
Once the objectives are identified, Tyler suggested that they be 
screened, based on a philosophical and psychological criteria. 
Second, once the lists of objectives have been prioritized, learning 
experiences need to be developed which will provide interaction for the 
student and will ultimately enable the student to achieve the stated 
objectives. Tyler ( 1949) identified this interaction as being between 
the students and their environments; however, the teachers have the abil-
ity to control those environments such that the objective can be met. 
Third, once the activities or experiences have been determined, they 
must be organized so that the student is able to achieve the specified 
objective. Tyler (1949) suggested three categories for organization: 
1. Continuity--vertical reiteration or recurring opportunities 
to learn various skills, 
2. Sequence--exposure to experiences that build upon each 
other, 
3. Integration--the relationship among different subjects in 
curriculum (pp. 84-85). 
Once these have been accomplished, then fourth, there must be some 
form of evaluation. This requires that the objectives be written to 
include both a content component and a behavioral component that can be 
observed and evaluated. Evaluation is accomplished through tests, obser-
vation, interviews, questionnaires, and actual student products. 
In applying this model to the student, Tyler (1949) suggested that 
students need some sort of initial analysis to determine their present 
status. Once this is determined, the outcome should be compared to the 
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accepted norm to determine deficiencies. After it is determined where 
the students are deficient, the model can be applied ·tO···hel p them .a.chieve 
the acceptable norm. According to Tyler, 11 The real objective of educa-
tion is to bring about significant changes in the student•s patterns of 
behavior 11 (p. 44). Therefore, Tyler saw objectives, not as specific hab-
its that students acquire, but rather as, 11 ••• modes of reaction to be 
developed 11 (p. 43). This change in behavior is accomplished by determin-
ing- deficiencies, providing specific opportunities for interaction, and 
evaluating to determine the success in remediating the student•s 
behavior. 
The Tyler model has since become the foundation of most schools to-
day, whether it be a conscious use of the model or an unconscious use. 
Schools are built around stated objectives, whether it be at the state 
level, local level, or in daily lesson plans. The learning process is 
broken down into segregated parts to which the phrase 11 scope and 
sequence 11 is now applied. Learning is the result of building onto previ-
ously learned concepts in a piecemeal fashion and thus becomes a linear 
process. Once a student has progressed through this maze of predeter-
mined objectives at a certain level of proficiency, they are then deemed 
educated. 
Conclusion 
When reviewing the concepts of the Tyler model, one is able to see 
the correlation between the components of Tyler• s model for curriculum 
and the basic principles of classical science. Gal ilea, Descartes, and 
Newton sought to understand the order of the universe through a reduc-
tionist frame of reference. By utilizing that same reductionist concept, 
Tyler sought to reduce curriculum to its most elementary parts, and then 
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to construct the educational process in building block fashion. Tyler, 
through explicit objectives and experiences, attempted to order curricu-
1 urn such that the learning experience became orderly, predictable, and 
deterministic. While mathematics provided the language of classical 
science, so too does mathematics provide a language for determining suc-
cess of students in achieving the stated objectives of curriculum. Eval-
uation of a student•s success in meeting stated curriculum goals, most 
typically, is through testing. The test results thus provide a mathemat-
ical description of a student•s success in learning. Just as classical 
science provided for no direct relation between humans and their uni-
verse, Tyler excluded the learner from curriculum. Curriculum was a 
separate entity to be acquired by the student. Consequently, the reality 
described in Tyler•s curriculum model is objective, contains causal rela-
tionships, and is therefore deterministic. It is very reflective of the 
11 classical 11 scientific paradigm that saturated not only the scientific 
community, but also curriculum theory. 
CHAPTER III 
THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION 
Introduction 
Because scientists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were 
able to extend their observations and experiments due to technology and 
advanced mathematics, they were forced to develop new methods and rewrite 
scientific theories that reflected the reality they were now capable of 
observing. These same theories and methods were, in turn, challenged as 
a new generation of scientists expanded upon this knowledge through more 
sophisticated technology. As a result of this technology, scientists 
were now able to deal with occurrences at the atomic and subatomic lev-
els. Thus, quantum mechanics grew from the ability to observe the finite 
elements of nature•s phenomena. With the onset of the twentieth century, 
science once again found itself in the midst of uncovering a new inter-
pretation of reality. This new interpretation (known as the Copenhagen 
Interpretation of quantum mechanics) presented new avenues of knowledge 
to explore which required new scientific methods to comprehend the un-
folding reality. 
A Brief History of Quantum Mechanics 
Three landmark findings marked the, beginning of what has become 
known as quantum mechanics. They include the discovery of discontinuous 
motion, the law of radioactive disintegration, and the discovery of the 
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wave-particle duality. All three discoveries originated from an attempt 
by scientists to understand the properties of light. 
The first landmark discovery came in 1889, when Professor Max Planck 
of Berlin published findings from his work dealing with radiation. He 
was able to prove that motion associated with nature was discontinuous, 
rather than continuous, as found in classical science. It was the belief 
in continuous motion that had allowed Newton to develop his three laws of 
motion, and according to Newton, not only was motion continuous but enti-
ties interacted with each other. Consequently, each interaction caused 
their motion to either accelerate or change direction. These findings 
thus found motion in a continuous state and constituted the principle of 
causality, which was defined as the belief that for every effect there 
must be a logical cause. 
Planck 1 S (1987) findings not only challenged the principle of cau-
sal ity, they also made two other significant contributions to science. 
First, he was able to explain what had fascinated scientists before him; 
namely, the behavior of light. Planck demonstrated mathematically that 
light waves did not travel in continuous motion, but rather propagated in 
-discontinuous motion. Second, he made his explanation of light behavior 
through a mathematical formula which could not be visualized. This lack 
of visualization introduced a new era into the scientific conmunity. No 
longer could science rely upon observation for verification of experi-
ments, but now was forced to depend upon intuition and the blind accept-
ance of mathematical findings. Because the principle of discontinuous 
motion radically altered scientific principles, scientists such as Bohr 
began exploring the ramifications of this new concept. 
Bohr (1987) expanded Planck • s concept of discontinuity by applying 
it to electrons, which at this time were the ultimate particle. Bohr ,__ 
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compared the movement of electrons, not to a train which moved smoothly 
and 11 Conti nuously 11 on track, but rather to kangaroos hopping about in a 
field. This comparison to kangaroos illustrated the spontaneous and 
discontinuity of motion that Bohr felt was characteristic of electrons. 
Thus, science began to comprehend the motion of particles. This new 
knowledge not only opened up new areas for scientists to explore, it also 
began to chip away at the foundation of classical science. 
Like Planck, Rutherford and Soddy (1987) also challenged the princi-
ple of causality with the second landmark discovery. In 1903, Rutherford 
and Soddy presented the fundamental law of radioactive disintegration. 
According to this law, atoms of radioactive substances split spontan-
eously and not as the result of any particular happening or condition. 
This discovery completed the destruction of the laws of causality by 
demonstrating that there was no apparent 11 cause 11 for radioactive break 
up. 
, In 1917, Einstein presented the third major landmark discovery, 
which would eventually win him a Nobel Prize in 1921. Through a theoret-
ical investigation, Einstein attempted to connect Planck•s findings of 
discontinuous motion with Rutherford and Soddy•s law of radioactive dis-
integration. He showed that the laws that governed the disintegration of 
radioactive substances also governed the spontaneous jumps of kangaroos 
that Bohr had earlier described. These laws were of the simplest statis-
tical form. They showed that, out of any number of kangaroos, a certain 
percentage would jump within a given time, yet there was nothing observ-
able to determine the kangaroos that were about to jump from those that 
were not. The only explanation that could be derived was that the jumps 
were in accordance with statistical law. This statistical concept thus 
opened the door for Einstein to comprehend the nature of light. 
31 
Through his findings, Einstein proposed that light consisted not of 
1 i ght waves (as had been determined in 1860 by Maxwe 11), but of energy 
particles. This concept supplied the answer to what medium was present 
for 1 ight to travel on if space did not contain particles of ether on 
which light could travel. This answer had eluded scientists since the 
determination had been made that space was empty and that light could be 
seen in a vacuum. This finding, however, presented a paradox to scien-
tists. Waves and particles now seemed to be independent entities, yet 
light appeared to assume both characteristics, depending upon the experi-
ment. Scientists had thus discovered the wave-particle duality of nature 
and, as the wave-particle duality began to emerge into the field of phys-
ics, so too did the concept of discontinuity. Jeans (1946, p. 127) 
stated that, 11 As discontinuity marched into the world of phenomena 
through one door, causality walked out through another. 11 
These new scientific concepts were a dramatic break with classical 
physics. Quantum mechanics not only changed .the Jaw.s .of physjcs but .,, .-.-.,. .... .-:'"(, 
also altered the focus of scientific questions. Where classical science 
had provided the ability to predict future behavior, quantum mechanics 
could only provide statistical probabilities because of the unpredictable 
characteristic of nature. Quantum mechanics (theory) can be suiJIIlarized 
as a method through which scientists can predkt probabilities that mea-
surements of specified kinds will produce certain responses in given 
situations. Because of the ambiguities associated with quantum mechan-
ics, some scientists prefer to regard it more as a set of rules ·that are 
used to identify the outcome of experiments. Regardless of its use, 
quantum mechanics presented a totally new way of looking at nature; con-
sequently, the scientists involved with quantum mechanics were on the 
cutting edge of a new era (paradigm) in science. 
32 
Bohr and Heisenburg were two such scientists, whose discoveries and 
methods have since been considered the foundation of quantum mechanics. 
Their contributions came about as a result of expanding and refining the 
earlier concepts dealing with motion of subatomic particles. Their re-
sulting theories (Bohr•s Principle of Complimentarity and Heisenburg•s 
Principle of Uncertainty) forced scientists to reevaluate the total 
concept of reality. Bohr and Heisenburg•s interpretation of reality 
spurred an argument between scientists that 1 as ted for many years and 
still continues to hold room for discussion. 
Bohr•s Principle of Complimentarity 
The wave-particle duality of nature intrigued scientists and the 
knowledge gained from their experiments eventually led to Bohr•s theory 
on compl imentarity. In 1924, Prince Louis de Broglie (cited in Boorse, 
Motz, and Weaver, 1989) showed that electrons possess wave particles 
which can be described in terms of wave lengths and frequencies related 
to their momenta. Schroedinger (1987), taking de Broglie•s wave nature 
of particles, believed that if it was possible to describe the propaga-
tion of light by a wave equation, then one must be able to describe a 
wave pattern by a wave equation. This equation made it possible to trace 
the motion of particles with a limited degree of accuracy. Born (1987) 
continued by showing that the waves associated with a particle must be 
interpreted as a statement of probability for finding a particle in a 
given space at a given time. Consequently, the particles appear to be-
have not only as a wave, but also as a particle. This "wave-particle" 
duality was now part of quantum mechanics, and was a result of the con-
t inuity-d i scont inuity dua 1 ity. The concept of dua 1 ity presented the 
opportunity for Bohr to explore the idea of complimentarity. 
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Bohr first introduced the term 11 compl imentarity 11 in 1927, when he 
referred to the complimentary relationships that exist between spatia-
temporal descriptions and causality. Bohr•s principle of complimentarity 
suggested that protons, .electrons, and other 11 particles 11 could exhibit 
both wave and particle properties. These two properties, however, could 
not exist simultaneously. Therefore, to gain a complete understanding of 
the whole entity, it required that both properties be considered. 
Bohr (1958) explained this duality of nature by stating that evi-
dence obtained under various experimental conditions could not be under-
stood within the frames of a single picture, but could only be regarded 
as complimentary, in that the tota 1 i ty of a phenomenon goes beyond the 
data obtained in a given experiment. When compared to classical science, 
Bohr (1963) explained that classical science allowed one to understand or 
comprehend the total nature of an object through experimentation, whether 
it be one experiment or several experiments whose results supplemented 
each other. As a result of complimentarity, scientists were now being 
forced to accept that observations could only provide a partial view of 
an entity rather than a complete picture as could be had through classi-
cal methods. 
This wave-particle duality became part of a new paradigm in science. 
However, as typical in a period of changing paradigms, Bohr found himself 
dealing with concepts of the old classical paradigm. First, the individ-
ual entities (11 wave 11 and 11particles 11 ) both were carryovers from classical 
science and therefore brought with them specific concepts as to their 
nature, as defined by classical theories. Bohr found, however, that when 
these concepts were applied to quantum physics, their reactions were not 
the same as when applied to classical physics. Second, Bohr was seeking 
to determine what caused one or the other characteristic to appear. This 
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question of causality directly reflected classical methods, yet when 
speaking in terms of relative space-time, it thus became exclusive of 
classical mechanics. To reconcile these two scientific worlds, Bohr 
( 1963) concluded that the meaning of a concept was dependent upon the 
conceptua 1 framework from which it functioned. Therefore, given a new 
conceptual framework from which to view nature, Bohr was beginning to 
detect an element of randomness in nature. 
Heisenburg•s Principle of Uncertainty 
Another theory which also confirmed the random characteristic of 
nature was Heisenburg•s Principle of Uncertainty. Like Bohr, Heisenburg 
was also attempting to understand motion associated with atomic parti-
cles. He continually argued that one should abandon the use of models, 
which had been consistently used by scientists to explain scientific 
theories, and rely solely upon mathematics. Therefore, Heisenburg was 
perplexed as to why he could not calculate something as simple as the 
trajectory of an electron in a cloud chamber. 
While pondering this question, Heisenburg (1958) began to contem-
plate a statement made earlier by Einstein regarding the relevance of 
scientific theory. Einstein proposed that scientific theory ultimately 
determines what is observed by scientists. Heisenburg therefore began to 
question if nature only revealed situations that could be explained 
through the mathematics of quantum mechanics. However, he concluded that 
on the very small scale of the atom, there must be limits as to the ex-
tent that an event can be known. Therefore, if the position of a par-
ticle can be determined, one must lose information as to the velocity of 
the particle. Conversely, if one is able to determine the velocity, then 
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as a consequence of measurement, information pertaining to its position 
is lost. 
Scientists found that they could not control quantum reactions {the 
indivisible unit in which waves may be emitted or absorbed) when attempt-
ing to measure or observe atomic motion. Therefore, once a new element 
(such as a measuring device) is introduced into the atomic world, the 
device alters the motion and position of the particles. Consequently, 
the more accurate the measurement of either position or velocity, the 
less accurate the information will be on the other. Heisenburg (1958) 
found that knowledge of position is complimentary to knowledge of momen-
tum. Therefore, to know one with high accuracy requires that the other 
cannot be known with any degree of accuracy. However, both position and 
momentum must be determined if one is to understand the behavior of a 
system. As summarized by Heisenburg (1987, p. 365), 11 The exact knowledge 
of one variable can exclude the exact knowledge of another... This am-
biguity of nature thus forced Heisenburg to seek an answer through mathe-
matics that would explain this uncertain knowledge. 
In time, Heisenburg was able to explain this concept of uncertainty 
through mathematics which produced statistical outcomes, and emerged in 
1927 with the principle of uncertainty. This principle marked the end of 
determinism in science. No longer could science hope to gain complete 
knowledge about an individual particle; consequently, predictions con-
cerning future behavior became impossible. The only prediction that 
science could now make would be statistical in that scientists could only 
predict the probability of a particle•s velocity or position. However, 
determinism was not the only theory of classical science to be challenged 
by the uncertainty principle. This principle also marked the end of 
absolute truth which had been a pillar of classical science. While 
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Newton, Galileo, and Descartes could gather information that allowed them 
to describe and understand whole entities, now scientists were being 
forced to accept trade-offs in knowledge concerning the subatomic world. 
Not only were scientists having to accept the idea of limited knowl-
edge, they also were being forced to deal with impact of the observer 
upon the observed. If the knowledge acquired in an experiment is af-
fected by the observer, then scientists began to question the role of the 
observer in determining reality. This concept eventually led to a para-
dox that still provides the following topics for discussion: 
1. Is reality subjective or objective? 
2. Is there a reality present outside of one•s ability to observe, 
or does the act of observation determine the characteristics of reality? 
The Copenhagen Interpretation provided a view of quantum mechanics 
which attempted to answer these fundamental questions of science. Though 
this interpretation resulted in a major division in the scientific world 
and still provides questions to be answered, it has emerged as the most 
accepted interpretation, to date., of reality. 
The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
The Principle of Complimentarity and the Principle of Uncertainty 
~rovided the framework for the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Me-
chanics. This i nterpr~tation rejected the .... ide a that nature caul d be 
understood simply by comprehending the existence of entities in both 
space and time. Even though no formal doctrine was ever presented as 
such, the Copenhagen Interpretation has received much acclaim for its 
-ability to explain natural phenomenon. 
The Copenhagen Interpretation represented an admission by scientists 
who attended the Fifth Solvay Congress in 1927 (Einstein, Bohr, Planck, 
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de Broglie, Schroedinger, Born, Larentz, Kramers, Pauli, Dirac, and Heis-
enburg) that one could not completely understand reality through the use 
of rational logic. These scientists began to believe that one could 
never fully comprehend the nature of reality itself, but only consider 
ideas about the nature of reality. 
The scientists at the Fifth Solvay Congress started to ponder the 
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ramification of Heisenburg•s uncertainty principle which had produced the 
probability function. These scientists realized that a probability func-
tion could not describe a specific event, but rather describes a contin-
uum of pass i b l e events until a measurement is taken, thus interfering 
with the system, and a single event is identified. Hei senburg (1958) 
best described this phenomenon by explaining that 11 classicaP science 
begins by measuring the position and velocity of the planet being 
studied. The results of the observation are translated into mathematics 
by identifying the numbers for the coordinates and the momenta of the 
planet. The mathematical equations thus allows an astronomer to predict 
the properties of the system at a later date. However, in quantum the-
ory, if one is attempting to determine the motion of an electron through 
a cloud chamber and can determine the initial position and velocity of 
the electron, the information gathered will not be completely accurate, 
for it will be impossible to determine both the position and velocity of 
the electron with any degree of accuracy. Due to the quantum nature of 
these electrons, if one attempts to determine the position of the elec-
tron, the velocity is altered as the electron collides with the measuring 
instrument. Conversely, as one attempts to measure the velocity, the 
mere presence of the measuring device will alter the position of the 
electron, thus pr_oviding inaccurate information. 
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Heisenburg (1958) further pointed out that the inaccuracies stemming 
from the uncertainty relations allow scientists to translate the conclu-
sions of their observations into the mathematical formulas associated 
with quantum theory. The probability function associated with this type 
of experiment represents two components which are, in turn, interrelated. 
It first represents a fact in that it assigns an initial probability time 
to the given situation, meaning that the observed electron is moving at 
an identifiable velocity at a given position. One must understand that 
11 observed 11 is limited to the accuracy of the experiment. 
The second component is that of knowledge, defined as the recogni-
tion that another observer could possibly have more accurate information 
concerning the position of the electron. Heisenburg stressed that errors 
associated with an experiment are not associated with the electron it-
self, but rather represent a deficiency in knowledge about the electron. 
The knowledge concerning the position of an entity is complimentary to 
the knowledge about its velocity. The more information one has concern-
ing either property (position or velocity), the less accurate one becomes 
in calculating the other property. Yet, neither property can be excluded 
if the observer is to determine the behavior of the total system. Heis-
enburg came to the conclusion that the space-time description was compli-
mentary to the deterministic description of an atomic event. 
By introducing the idea of complimentarity into quantum mechanics, 
Bohr had succeeded not only in showing the individuality of quantum phe-
nomena, but also in identifying the unique features associated with the 
problems of observation. The individuality associated with quantum me-
chanics is witnessed by the fact that every reduct ion of a phenomenon 
will require altering the experiment. This reduction results in creating 
further possibility for interaction between the object and measuring 
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instrument. This concept then leads to the next topic introduced by 
Bohr, that being the effect of observation on the subject. 
It was determined that the act of observation cements a description 
into a specific space and time and, consequently, breaks down the conti-
nuity of the system, thus altering one•s knowledge of the system. Bohr 
(1963) pointed out that 11 Classical 11 science allowed the observer to ne-
glect the interaction between the object and measuring instrument, and if 
not totally neglected, at least compensated for in the final calcula-
tions. However, in quantum mechanics, one must account for all relevant 
features that comprise the experiment because of quantum reaction and 
interaction. 
The concepts of probability, uncertainty, and the active role of the 
observer a 11 provided the framework of the Copenhagen Interpretation. 
However, there are two key ingredients to the Copenhagen Interpretation • • 
First is the concept that quantum theory contains nothing that can be 
perceived as descriptions of qualities of nature which might be located 
at a specific point or immeasurably minute region in space and time. 
These descriptions are more like abstract symbolic devices that allow 
scientists to predict what will be observed in given situations. One 
must remember that the descriptions are more for utility purposes rather 
than descriptions of properties or qualities. Bohr (1958) observed that 
quantum mechanics provides a tool for complimentary description in that 
quantum mechanics is a symbolic method of making predictions. 
The second ingredient is the assumption that quantum theory provides 
a complete scientific account of atomic phenomenon. Bohr (1963) con-
cluded that quantum mechanics deals with the wholeness of entities and 
phenomenon, and even though outcomes of experiments are statistical in 
nature, they allow for the interaction of the object and measuring 
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apparatus. Therefore, the statistical representation of that interaction 
reflects the occurrence of individual quantum effects in any experimental 
arrangement. 
This interpretation of quantum mechanics not only required scien-
tists to admit to a reality that could not be visualized, but also one 
that depended upon a statistical interpretation rather than a reality 
that could be comprehended through exact mathematical formulas. This 
interpretation also required that the observer be recognized as an impor-
tant element in the creation of a specific reality. Bohr and Heisenburg 
were able to show that once an observation {measurement) was made, the 
motion of that object was disrupted and thus frozen in time. This dis-
covery had far-reaching ramifications. For example, reality henceforth 
was to be considered in terms of wholeness, which included not only the 
observed but a 1 so the observer, p 1 us the me as uri ng instrument. A 1 so, 
instead of describing one•s findings in terms of specific qualities, 
findings must be described in terms of relationships and probabilities. 
This interpretation of quantum mechanics thus destroyed the possibility 
of the existence of an independent reality that was open to investigation 
and held together by elements of causality. 
Einstein was present at the Fifth Solvay Conference (1927) when this 
interpretation of quantum mechanics was discussed, and even though he had 
contributed to the creation of quantum mechanics, he had great difficulty 
accepting this interpretation of it. What concerned Einstein most was 
the probabilistic or statistical requirement of quantum mechanics. He 
could not accept that there was no underlying deterministic theory to 
support quantum mechanics. Just as classical science was held together 
by classical mechanics, Einstein felt sure that there must be an under-
lying force that explained atomic reality. He was never convinced that 
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quantum mechanics could give one a complete description of nature, and 
for the next several years attempted to disprove the Copenhagen Interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. 
Einstein•s Theory of Relativity 
Einstein•s argument against the Copenhagen Interpretation was 
founded upon one of his earlier discoveries, the Theory of Relativity. 
This theory resulted from Einstein•s attempt to measure heavenly motion. 
When Maxwell, in 1860, discovered that light traveled through a vacuum, 
he also discovered that space did not consist of particles of ether. The 
elimination of ether removed the frame of reference that was required as 
a basis of measurement; thus, Einstein set out to find a replacement 
frame of reference. 
Einstein (1923) made two assumptions concerning motion and measure-
ment that provided the foundation of the Special Theory of Relativity 
which emerged in 1905. First, when one discovers the correct laws of 
physics, those laws will obey the primary laws of Galilean relativity: 
the laws will exhibit exactly the same forms in all uniformly moving, 
11 inertial , 11 reference frames. The second postulate asserts that the 
observed speed of light will be the same for any inertial frame. 
Einstein asserted that the Special Theory of Relativity did not 
deviate from classical science through the postulate of relativity, but 
rather through the consistency of the velocity of light which, when com-
bined with the special principle of relativity, produced the relativity 
of simultaneity. Where classical science allowed for uniform measure-
ment, Einstein was finding that measurement was relative, depending upon 
one•s frame of reference; however, scientific laws should be the same for 
all freely moving observers. 
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The concept of relativity radically modified scientists• concepts of 
space and time. As a result of this new finding, space, time, mass, and 
eventually simultaneity, all became accepted as relative properties. To 
illustrate the ramification of this concept, consider two events, such as 
snapping the fingers of both your hands with outstretched arms. Each 
event will have two separate sets of space and time values for any ob-
server. Classical science easily assumed that these two events were 
either simultaneous or not simultaneous. However, in special relativity, 
simultaneity is dependent upon the reference frame. A person in a space-
ship moving parallel to the outstretched arms will not witness the same 
snap of the fingers as would be observed from someone stationary on the 
earth. Consequently, if simultaneity no longer could be considered an 
absolute property, then it appeared that the universe had no verifiable 
reality. There were no universal moments and the present was only veri-
fiable relative to each observer. 
The concept of relativity began to change scientists• perceptions of 
the world. Newton had introduced the world to absolute time and space, 
and now Einstein, through his Theory of Relativity, began to redefine 
space and time and created a universe that consisted of separate space. 
separate time, and separate objects. The loss of absolute space and time 
allowed scientists to now consider that entities such as space, time, 
mass, electricity, etc .• could potentially interact with each other. 
rather than being perceived as independent entities, resulting from their 
formerly absolute status. 
The potential interrelatedness of space and time required a new type 
of mathematics. When classical scientists had looked at the space around 
them. they perceived it as consisting of small points which go together 
to make lines which, in turn, create planes. Scientists were now being 
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forced to deal with the possibility that the space around them might not 
be Euclidean. Space, which had been three-dimensional (length, breadth, 
and thickness), now merged with time and thus required four numbers to 
describe space-time. In four-dimensional geometry, motions that describe 
inertial systems are characterized by straight lines (called world 
lines); however, in systems that are accelerated, these world lines be-
come curved. Thus, the concepts 11 straight 11 and 11 Curved 11 become relative, 
in that they refer to orbits of the light rays and of freely moving bod-
ies. This principle destroys the structure of Euclidian geometry, be-
cause the foundation of Euclidian geometry was the classical law of 
inertia, which derives straight lines. This became the foundation for 
Einstein•s General Theory of Relativity. Hawking (1988, p. 184) 
explained that the General Theory of Relativity is, 11 ••• based on the 
idea that the laws of science should be the same for all observers, no 
matter how they are moving. It explains the force of gravity in terms of 
the curvature of a four-dimensional space-time. 11 
Einstein (1923) believed that the true geometry of the space-time 
continuum is non-Euclidean, or curved. He believed that the mere exis-
tence of mass di started space so that the shortest path between points 
was no longer a straight line, but rather curved on a curved surface. 
Motion of these masses was determined, not by a distant gravitational 
force as understood by Newton, but rather by the warped field of space-
time which he mathematically deduced as being finite, but having no 
boundaries. For example, under classical science a traveler on a sphere 
could keep walking indefinitely in any one direction, and would always 
return to the original starting point. Einstein, however, believed that 
the world was not shaped by Euclidean geometry consisting of parallel and 
perpendicular lines which acted mechanically, but rather was shaped by 
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masses and their velocities. This belief formed the framework of Ein-
stein•s theories of relativity. 
Through his Theory of Relativity, Einstein was not attempting to say 
that everything is relative as some have interpreted; in fact, he consid-
ered naming this theory the Invariance Theory. Einstein was able to 
discover, however, what was absolute despite the illusions and contra-
dictions presented by nature. The primary merit of the term 11 relativity 11 
is the concept that a scientist is unavoidably part of the system that is 
being studied. Therefore, Einstein gave new value to the role of the 
observer in science. Einstein was confident that an absolute truth did 
exist. Through the Theory of Relativity, he provided for the reconcilia-
tion of various observers• views in relationship to their velocity in 
their particular space-time forms. 
Einstein•s Response to the Copenhagen Interpretation 
Einstein•s background in the study of relativity could not allow him 
to accept the Copenhagen Interpretation. Einstein•s basic argument can 
be summarized into three main points: 
1. It is not proven that the usual concept of reality is 
unworkable. 
2. Quantum theory does not make •intelligible• what is sensor-
; ly given. 
3. If there is a more complete thinkable description of na-
ture, then the formulation of the universal laws should 
involve their use (cited in Stapp, 1972, p. 1109}. 
Einstein set forth to prove that there was an independent reality that 
existed apart from, and independent of, our sense reality. Over the next 
several years, he proposed to Bohr several thought experiments in an 
effort to disprove Bohr•s interpretation; however, in each instance Bohr 
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was able to refute the experiment. Einstein could not accept Bohr•s 
theory even though he had to concede to Bohr•s logic. 
In 1935, Einstein, along with Podolsky and Rosen, presented a paper 
entitled, 11 Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be 
Considered Complete? 11 (more commonly known as the 11 EPR paper 11 ). This 
paper became Einstein•s most profound attack on the concepts of quantum 
theory. In this paper, the authors attempted to show that the quantum 
mechanical description of nature could only provide an incomplete picture 
of reality. It focused on the belief that physical properties have no 
objective reality outside of the act of observation. Einstein felt con-
fident that 11 things 11 did possess specific properties independent of their 
measurement. The foundation of the EPR argument rests upon the statement 
that, 11 If without any way disturbing a system we can predict with cer-
tainty ••• the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an 
element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity 11 
(Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, 1935, p. 777). 
In the EPR paper, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) presented a 
thought experiment to disprove the principles of the Copenhagen Interpre-
tation. The situation created two space-time regions that were so far 
apart that the act of measurement in one space-time region could not 
affect the second space-time region by any known dynamical mechanisms. 
Within these two space-time regions, the authors stated, if one can as-
certain the motion of one particle, then one can determine the affects of 
that motion on a second particle without introducing the act of measure-
ment. For example, if the spin of one particle accelerates, then the 
spin of another particle decelerates. Does this not lead one to conclude 
that the second particle must have a complete identity outside of 
measurement? 
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The EPR paper argued that an element of matter must have a complete 
description which is not dependent upon any measurement. If one insisted 
upon interpreting the wave function of quantum mechanics (the probability 
of finding a particle at a given point) in terms of a single particle, 
this then creates a paradox in that the theory is both complete and yet 
incomplete. 
The authors of the EPR paper, through their concept of objectivity, 
pointed out that quantum theory must be accepted as being complete or it 
must then violate the concept of the principle of local causality. Since 
they were unwilling to give up the concept of causality, it must be de-
duced that quantum theory was incomplete. The authors of the EPR paper 
asserted that the true judge of a theory is the degree to which the con-
clusions of theory correspond to human experience. They further con-
cluded that this experience allows one to make inferences about reality. 
In science, that experience takes the form of experiments and measure-
ments. Consequently, for a theory to be complete, it must require that, 
11 Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the 
physical theory 11 (Einstein, Podolsky, and rosen, 1935, p. 777). Einstein 
further argued that since quantum mechanics was incapable of giving val-
ues to both position and momentum at the same time (uncertainty prin-
ciple), the picture of reality that is represented must be incomplete. 
Einstein believed that things you cannot understand or know in actuality 
must not exist. The EPR paradox. as it became known, was the source of 
much controversy in the scientific community. 
With the Copenhagen Interpretation, Einstein saw an end of deter-
minism and an abandonment of the ideal of a complete understanding of 
knowledge. Ultimately, around 1935, Einstein began to realize that no 
longer were he and Bohr debating questions concerning physics, but rather 
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epistemology. Einstein had argued from a position of abstract realism 
{the belief in a real world, independent of whether or not it is per-
ceived), while Bohr argued logical positivism (the belief that knowledge 
is based upon natural phenomena as verified through empirical science). 
Consequently, Einstein, though he hoped for a reconciliation, could not 
perceive of Bohr and himself reaching one as long as they worked from 
differing philosophical bases. 
Bohr•s Defense of the Copenhagen Interpretation 
After the publication of the EPR paper, Bohr set out to give a for-
mal answer. He replied that the EPR results were fallacious because they 
had taken the Copenhagen Interpretation out of context. Bohr asserted 
that the EPR findings dealt with the history of an element, while Bohr•s 
interpretation was aimed at the initial starting point of quantum action. 
Bohr (1958) later recounted his reply to Einstein. He pointed out that 
through the principle of complementarity, the inconsistencies shown in 
the EPR paper would be removed. Bohr further stated that, 11 The finite 
interaction between object and measuring agencies conditioned by the very 
existence of quantum action entails •.• the necessity of a final renun-
ciation of the classical idea of causal ity 11 (pp. 59-60). Bohr still 
could not abandon the belief that the measurement of a particle did af-
fect another particle in some undetermined way and continually believed 
that an understanding of quantum mechanics would include accounting for 
the act of measurement. 
Bohr•s rationale for this concept centered around his philosophy of 
science. He assumed that the purpose of science was to reduce nature to 
order. However, the problem arises in coordinating experiences with the 
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external world. Science can only understand or order nature to the de-
gree that nature corresponds to human experiences. 
The philosophy of James (cited in Stapp, 1972) help to understand 
the rationale used by Bohr in developing the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. According to James, all human ideas originate out of the 
realm of experience, yet it is commonly accepted that reality consists of 
parts that exist outside this realm of experience. The only way to con-
nect what is real to ideas is to consider reality as an idea. Ideas can 
only be compared to other ideas. It therefore becomes impossible for a 
mind to comprehend a correspondence between an idea and something that 
lies outside the realm of experience. The only evidence available that 
human ideas are capable of exact correspondence with the ultimate nature 
of external realities is the success of ideas in establishing order in 
physical experience. However, any success of an idea in this sphere does 
not guarantee an exact correspondence between the idea and external 
reality. 
If ideas bring some sense of order to experiences, even if they do 
not absolutely agree, they at least agree with the experiences for which 
they establish order. This leads to the conclusion that ideas can only 
be judged according to their success and utility in the world of ideas 
and experience, rather than on their ability to agree with or correspond 
with non-ideas. This substantiates Bohr's statements as to the purpose 
and goal of science. It is not the purpose of science to construct a 
mathematical picture of the world, but rather to bring it to order. 
In 1939, Einstein spoke at a colloquium at Princeton where he was 
asked to address the disagreement between himself and Bohr. Throughout 
the discussion, Einstein maintained that the laws of physics were simple, 
meaning whole and complete. He responded to a question from the 
49 
audience, 11 But if they are not simple, what then? Then I would not be 
interested in them 11 (cited in Blaedel, 1988, p. 177). Einstein ended the 
discussion by creating an analogy. 11 When a person such as a mouse ob-
serves the universe, does that change the state of the universe? 11 (cited 
in Blaedel, 1988, p. 178). 
Bohr did not argue the simplicity of physics but rather that sim-
plicity does not exist prior to the clarification of complexities. Only 
after one understands complexities does simplicity then emerge. Bohr 
(cited in Blaedel, 1988) explained that: 
••• harmony allows itself only to be sensed, never grasped, 
and if we attempt to grasp it, it slips through our fingers by 
its essential nature. Nothing is fixed: every thought, yes, 
every word even, lends itself merely to emphasize connections 
which in themselves can never be fully described, but can al-
ways be amplified (p. 178). 
These feelings outline not only the principles of the Copenhagen Inter-
pretation, but also allude to the fundamental problem that Einstein had 
in accepting this interpretation. While Bohr accepted the randomness of 
nature as being a unique characteristic, it opened up for Einstein more 
questions concerning the ultimate nature of the universe and left him 
searching for those answers. 
Conclusion 
Bohr and Einstein were never able to resolve this debate. In fact, 
even though the scientific world seemed to be siding with Bohr, he did 
not perceive it as a victory over Einstein, but rather found it incompre-
hensible that Einstein persisted in his doubts. Einstein summarized his 
feelings concerning the concepts of reality being affected by the ob-
server, events that happened randomly and without any seeming cause, by 
saying, 11 God does not play dice with the world. God may be subtle, but 
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he is not malicious .. (Einstein, cited in Regis, 1987, p. 24). Heisenburg 
(1985) recalled Bohr•s response to Einstein upon making this statement. 
Bohr (cited in Heisenburg, 1985, p. 171) countered by stating, 11 Nor is it 
our business to prescribe to God how he should run the world. 11 
One of Einstein•s most admired personal heroes was the natural phi-
losopher, Spinoza. In Spinoza•s (cited in Blaedel, 1988, p. 177) Ethics, 
he stated, 11 Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are 
conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity 
of divine nature. 11 This philosophy seems to have laid the foundation 
for, or at least confirmed, Einstein•s deep belief in determinism. 
In 1965, Bell (cited in Pagels, 1987) dealt a severe blow to Ein-
stein•s position as espoused in the EPR paper. Bell proposed an experi-
ment that showed the incompleteness of quantum theory presented in the 
EPR paper was not possible. According to Bell 1 s experiment, either the 
world was nonobjective or the world was non local, with instantaneous 
action-at-a-distance. It demonstrated that the predictions (statistical) 
associated with quantum theory are not compatible with an underlying 
reality whose independent components are linked only by a causality rela-
tionship. They must be linked in ways that go beyond a causality rela-
tionship. 
The reality that was described by the Copenhagen Interpretation 
shook the very foundation of the scientific community. The concepts of 
causality, determinism, objective reality, and an ultimate truth that was 
to be sought by scientists, seemed now to be questionable. These con-
cepts were being replaced by new concepts, such as probability, the need 
to understand relationships in order to understand potential qualities, 
and relative truth which is dependent upon the wholeness consisting of 
the observed and the observer. Scientists were also beginning to 
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understand the limits of language and, as a result, could only utilize 
the present language as symbolic descriptors of phenomena. These con-
cepts appeared to be able to answer or describe the events that transpire 
in nature, yet they required scientists to utilize new methods of discov-
ery which replaced visualization and logic with senses and statistics. 
In 1982, Feynman made the statement in regards to the EPR paradox, 
11 I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there's no real 
problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem 11 (cited in Regis, 1987, 
p. 33). In other words, a reality that exists outside of one's observa-
tion may still be possible. 
Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of Einstein and 
Bohr's arguments, they did perceive a new reality. This reality gave new 
value to the observer and eliminated a confining determinism as had been 
found in classical science. Jeans (1946, p. 216) alluded to this new 
reality by stating that, "Classical physics seemed to bolt and bar the 
door 1 eadi ng to any sort of freedom of the wi 11 • • • the new physics 
shows us a universe which ••. might conceivably form a suitable dwell-
ing place for free men." 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONCEPT OF AN EMERGING REALITY 
Introduction 
In 1928, Urban stated that humankind is made such that they cannot 
help trying to understand the universe and environment in which they 
live. Science begins this search by attempting to understand how a par-
ticular entity fits into its specific space and time. Science, however, 
transcends into philosophy when scientists begin inquiring into the mean-
ing of the universe that they are studying. 11 Unless 1 how did it happen• 
passes over into •why did it happen,• we get nowhere, we stultify all our 
previous inquiry 11 (Urban, 1928, p. 637). The only conceivable under-
standing of this process is the ability to discover what is acknowledged 
by a society as being significant and meaningful. 
Urban•s (1982) concepts describe the continuous search by human 
beings for a meaningful reality in which they individually and collec-
tively interact. It appears that the body of knowledge that is being 
sought does, to some degree, define who people are individually. When 
people speak of their search for identity, they are in actuality realiz-
ing that self-identity is not an absolute, but rather is qualified, rela-
tive, partial, and very complex. This realization destroys the belief in 
an absolute reality in which a person actively participates. If this is 
true, it must be deduced that to understand reality one must consider the 
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environment, the person, and the interaction between the two, including 
the language that is used to describe each. 
Characteristics of Reality 
The interaction between the person and the environment can best be 
understood or explained by reviewing the various characteristics of real-
ity. These specific characteristics can be summarized as the ability of 
a person to process experiences into perceptions through the mind and 
thus arrive at consciousness. When one comprehends the implications of 
each of these characteristics, one begins to view reality as an evolving 
entity comprised of a complex maze of interrelated abstractions. 
Whitehead (1929} began the study of reality by analyzing the ability 
of a person (entity) to process information. He explained that within 
the general context of an 11 entity 11 or 11 thing, 11 
••• it possesses the ability for process ••• ; so 'decision• 
is the add it i ona 1 meaning imported by the word • actua 1' into 
the phrase •actual entity.• [Therefore], •actuality• is the 
decision amid •potentiality• (p. 43). 
Given this premise, it must be assumed that the ability to make decisions 
supposes that there are alternatives from which to select and choose. 
Hence, if an entity is not considered an absolute, then as substan-
tiated by Whitehead (1929}, existences are constantly undergoing a chang-
ing process. Existences are therefore comprised of successive momentary 
states and, if to each state a specific relation is assigned, then change 
(which is an integral part of an entity) becomes the progression of ac-
tual entities wherein each individual entity emerges rather than changes. 
The closest comprehendible example that we have is a single human experi-
ence that is encountered within a fraction of a second. This brief en-
counter is itself not experienced in its entirety, for human beings are 
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limited in their introspective power. They experience, feel, sense, 
intuit, but have only limited understanding of what, or how, they ex-
perience, feel, or intuit. As will be shown, these individual experi-
ences have tremendous impact upon the way future encounters wi 11 be 
interpreted. 
Entities encountered outside of momentary experiences must be iden-
tified as analogous to past experiences of the observer. Therefore, the 
moment an experience is encountered, it is then subjected to interpreta-
tion by the person. Consequently, reality constructs originate from the 
interpretation and reinterpretation of experiences. Thus, experiencing 
is viewed as continuous change, and when viewed as a continuum, no single 
part can be identified, for a point or instant is only a conceptual ideal 
that is part of the total continuum. When thinking about the creation of 
reality, one must keep in mind that experiences are only a part of real-
ity; reality is not an ingredient of experience. Hence, it is this in-
terrelatedness with the other distinct parts of reality that must be 
given consideration. 
11 Experience 11 leads one to ponder the concept of perception. 
Whitehead is probably the first philosopher to define perceptions as 
memory in regards to past experiences rather than of present experiences. 
By the time one sees or hears an event, it has already transpired. 
Consequently, any perception that one derives from an encounter does not 
come simultaneously with the encounter, but in retrospect. Since an 
event is in the process of becoming, until it has affected the person, 
there is nothing to experience. Thus, all perceptions of reality are in 
terms of past experiences. Capra (1984, p. 38) further stated that, 
11 What we see, or hear, are never the investigated phenomena themselves, 
but always their consequences. 11 This implies that one•s perceptions of 
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past experiences hold great consequences for the interpretation of real-
ity. For it is within the framework of past experiences that one inter-
prets present experiences. 
It is through this ability to perceive experiences that human beings 
are able to make evaluation and judgments regarding present experiences 
and future encounters. It is, therefore, the collection of these experi-
ences that contribute to the realization of a human or an entity. White-
head (1929, p. 163) explained that, 11 The defining characteristic of a 
1 ivi ng person is some definite type hybrid pre hens ion transmitted from 
one occasion to another. 11 This view of human existence rests upon the 
premise that there is a causal relationship between experiences of the 
past or present and experiences that will be encountered in the future. 
Whitehead (1938, p. 206) further emphasized that 11 ••• these unities of 
existence, these occasions of experience, are the real things which in 
their collective unity compose the evolving universe. 11 
Bateson (cited in Capra, 1988) added still another element to the 
concept of reality, that being the concept of the mind. He defined the 
mind, 11 As a systems phenomenon characteristic of 'living things' 11 (p. 
83). The phenomena associated with the mind--the ability to process 
information and the ability to think, learn, and possess memory--are not 
only manifested in individual organisms but also in social systems. 
According to this concept, mind is immanent not only in the body but also 
in the communication systems outside the body. This ability to process 
information and react based on recalled experiences ultimately estab-
lishes a sense of order to one's existence. 
Prigogine (1976, p. 84) helped to clarify this notion of order by 
explaining that, 11 The patterns of organization which are characteristic 
of living systems can be understood through the concept of self 
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organization... Prigogine further pointed out that a living organism 
fulfills the definition of a self-organizing system in that its order is 
established not by the environment, but rather by itself; consequently, 
it possesses an element of autonomy. This autonomy does not mean that an 
entity is isolated from its environment, but rather is in a state of 
continual interaction with its environment, just not organized by the 
environment. Organization is thus determined by the function of the 
organism. Because an organism has the capability to organize its struc-
ture in accordance with its function, there appears to be an apparent 
relationship between the structure and function of the organism. Even 
though an organism must exist within a particular environment and inter-
act with that environment, the concept of self-organization describes a 
different relationship between the environment and the organism than had 
previously been thought. Whitehead (1938) suggested that this structure 
of an organism is one element that separates human beings from animals. 
While animals enjoy structure, human beings understand structure. Thus, 
11 The essence of • • • human control of purposes depends on the under-
standing of structure in its variety of applications .. (Whitehead, 1938, 
pp. 104-105). 
The concept of mind then leads to the concept of consciousness. 
According to Pankow (1976, p. 28), 11 The transition from prehension 
(grasping) to comprehension is symbolic of the emergence of conscious-
ness... As one interacts with new experiences, one begins to develop 
conceptions, and it is this ability to conceive which lays the foundation 
for perceiving and thus transferring understanding to new situations. 
This concept of consciousness extends to and includes percept ions of 
physical things. Perceptions towards entities are structured by one•s 
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specific time and space region, symbolic patterns, values, and one's 
communicative links. 
Whitehead (1935} described "objects" as being antecedent entities in 
the process of experiencing. "Thus primarily the term 'object• expresses 
the relation of the entity to one or more occasions of experiencing" (p. 
178). Another word for object might be the "data" for that specific 
encounter. Consciousness thus becomes an emphasis upon a selection of 
these objects, while perception is the analysis of consciousness in re-
spect to those objects selected to be emphasized. Consciousness, there-
fore, emerges as the height of emphasis. 
Whitehead (1938) ascertained that there must be a unity between 
individuals and their environment. Hence, the only way that an individ-
ua 1 can comprehend one's environment is to trans 1 ate or interpret that 
environment in terms of one's own world or consciousness. Unless there 
is a fusion between the physical world and the essential elements whose 
interconnections constitute the universe, one can never hope to compre-
hend nature or life. What living entities understand about themselves in 
relation to the universe is through experience. This concept of experi-
ence includes total body experience--including both reason and emotion. 
An entity is never able to isolate its experiences, but rather sees the 
experiences in relationship to the universe. Consequently, all experi-
ences include the individual self and one's consequential value or rela-
tionship to the universe. 
Four major elements have thus far been discussed in determining how 
reality is created. They include: experience, perception, mind, and 
consciousness. Seemingly, all four of these ingredients are essential 
to individuals in understanding their interaction with their environment, 
and thus become the key components in reality. Yet, no matter how 
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important each of these elements may be to that reality, they individ-
ually are not reality. 
Communicating Reality 
Once a person becomes aware of self-reality, one experiences the 
need to communicate that reality, either to oneself or to others. Lan-
guage has emerged as the primary means of communication among human 
beings. Whitehead {1938, p. 44) asserted that, 11 Language is the triumph 
of human ingenuity surpassing even the intricacies of modern technology. 11 
Any discussion of reality must include a discussion of language, for it 
is through the use of language that people describe their environment. 
Whitehead perceived the role of language, whether written or spoken, as 
being an instrument by which humans are able to adjust to their environ-
ment. Consequently, language serves two functions. First, it allows one 
to coTIJTiunicate with another; second, it allows one to communicate with 
oneself. 
As a tool for adjustment, language assumes many purposes in obtain-
ing or in aiding that adjustment. The most basic use of language is 
merely a series of squeaks whose purpose is to express emotion or to 
communicate. Words can also be utilized to record and consequently re-
tain experiences in memory. These words then make it possible to, or at 
least provide assistance in, the recall of past experiences. It is 
through the use of language that humans are then able to give a semblance 
of organization to experiences as they are remembered in retrospect. As 
a means of communication, language allows human beings to comprehend the 
past and consequently to make predictions concerning the future. White-
head (1938) espoused that language is the expression from an individual's 
past into the present; therefore, language carries with it meaning 
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derived from realities of the past. Consequently, past experiences hold 
tremendous implications for present experiences due to the meanings and 
concepts associated with the language that is used to judge present 
encounters. 
However, there are some basic problems in describing reality through 
the use of conmon language. One such problem associated with language is 
its deficiency in meaning. There are evident variations in the meanings 
associated with a language, even though these variations are not easily 
verbalized. Thus, it becomes impossible to incorporate into a train of 
thought what one apprehends in mere flashes. Consequently, one is left 
only with the deceptive identity of an individual word. Because of this 
specific limitation, language must be perceived or utilized as a " ••• 
tool-making function of one•s intelligence" (Urban, 1938, p. 621). How-
ever, it cannot be allowed to become an "absolute" in that it possesses 
the ability to curtail one•s search for true expression. 
Putnam (1975) addressed this vagueness of language through the con-
cept of "notion of reference." This concept is defined as, 11 What •fits• 
a description is what the description refers to; that is, what the de-
scription is true of" (Putnam, 1975, p. 283). The relationship between 
the world and word is the ultimate definition of "reference." A prime 
example of this concept is Bohr•s description of an electron. It is 
impossible to find a particle in existence which completely fulfills 
Bohr•s description of a particle. What is found, however, are particles 
which approximately fit the description. They contain the appropriate 
charge, mass, and, "Most important, they are responsible for key effects 
for which Bohr thought electrons were responsible" (Putnam, 1975, p. 
275). Consequently, we are left with a word whose definition does not 
exactly match the reality of an entity. 
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Not only is vagueness of definition a problem associated with lan-
guage, but also the ability to understand the definition produced emerges 
as another problem. Modern knowledge is utilizing mathematics more and 
more in the description of current reality; however, it also must be 
remembered that mathematics is a unique correlation between language and 
reality. To comprehend the reality that is described mathematically 
requires an individual to have an understanding of the language utilized 
to express that reality. For example, consider how the world must appear 
to someone who has never heard of or comprehended any scientific descrip-
tions of the cosmos. The earth must appear flat and the sun and moon 
appear as shining discs that appear daily. This person will not be able 
to comprehend the concepts of a solar system, gravity, or planetary mo-
tion. Through common sense, they will deduce that bodies fall to the 
ground, not because of gravitational forces, but rather because there is 
nothing to hold them up. This same common sense provides this person 
visualized answers exp 1 a i ni ng the environment. These answers are com-
municated between members of the culture and therefore, 1 i ngui stically 
meet the needs of the society. However, when these words can no longer 
adequately meet the needs of this society, then they will work out in 
language new answers that will fulfill needs. As illustrated, one•s 
ability to comprehend and describe reality is dependent upon the con-
ceptions of language and, unless one has a thorough understanding of 
definitions and concepts associated with a specific language, one•s per-
ception of reality can be radically altered accordingly. Consequently, 
one•s reality or understanding of reality may vary from one to another, 
dependent upon understanding of linguistics used for description. 
Regardless of the problems associated with language, it is still the 
primary medium for communication and thought among human beings. 
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Whitehead (1938, p. 57} stated that, 11 The souls of men are the gift from 
language to mankind. The mentality of mankind and the language of man-
kind created each other. 11 Therefore, it is through language that humans 
have the ability to express their thoughts and thus verbalize their 
reality. 
Knowledge in Reality 
It becomes quite obvious that individual reality is dependent upon 
the development of consciousness of experiences and it is as one inter-
acts with the environment that one builds a repertoire of experiences 
which wi 11 determine reactions to future experiences and encounters. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that what one sees in reality depends not 
only upon what is looked at, but also what one•s 11 ••• previous visual-
conceptual experiences has taught [them] to see 11 (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 113). 
Language thus becomes the format through which human beings attempt 
to describe and organize these experiences, for emerging experiences must 
be interpreted before they can become knowledge. 
Every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, 
in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by 
which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes 
nature, notices, or neglects type of relationships and phenom-
ena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his con-
sciousness (Carroll, 1956, p. 252). 
Therefore, it can be logically concluded that consciousness is the foun-
dation of knowledge. Thus, if knowledge does exist, it can only be un-
covered as part of the total experience of an entity. To Whitehead 
(1929), knowledge is to be found in conscious experience or verified 
through intuitive observation. Whitehead (1935, p. 177} continued by 
defining knowledge as the 11 • • • conscious discrimination of objects 
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experienced •11 Therefore, knowledge and experience are forever 1 inked 
together within the realm of reality. 
To illustrate these three approaches to reality, Jantsch (1975) 
uti 1 i zed the concept of a stream and an observer to create a metaphor 
that demonstrates the relationship between the observer and the object of 
observation. The first picture drawn shows the observer sitting on the 
edge of the stream, noticing the various characteristics of the water. 
In this particular setting, the observer is objective in witnessing a 
reality that exists independent of observation and measurement. It is a 
reality that can be measured, predicted, and studied, with the observer 
having no impact whatsoever upon its existence; it is a value-free real-
ity. The observer is merely, 11 • the objective knower of the stream, 
the known reality 11 (Haggerson, 1988, p. 84). 
The second scene depicts the observer in a boat in the stream. The 
observer attempts to guide the boat by monitoring the features on both 
sides of the boat. By keeping close watch on both banks, the observer 
attempts to keep the boat centered in the stream. The result is that the 
observer now becomes emotionally involved because of the feelings experi-
enced resulting from the interaction with the stream. This emotion thus 
moves the observation from an objective state to a more subjective state, 
for the observer is not only concerned with ideas, but also with feel-
ings. However, the stream is still objective in that it can be measured, 
but in this case, the measurement wi 11 reflect the presence of the ob-
server. Jantsch (1975) perceived this reality as being mythological in 
that the order originates from qualities that are subjective and their 
interactions. For example, one•s daily life is comprised of interactions 
with objects which can appear either friendly or threatening, and as a 
result, order is established as a consequence of one•s perceptions of 
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outside forces. This rea 1 ity is concerned primarily with the 11 • • • 
conditions of [one's] captivity in a world which is happening to [them] 11 
(p. 86}. 
The third picture of this metaphor shows the observer becoming the 
stream. They actively participate in all of the movement and become part 
of the unique characteristic of the stream. However, though they are the 
stream, they are only part of it. This approach to understanding incor-
porates a true hierarchical relationship. As one descends in the hier-
archy, a better understanding is gained of the microscopic processes 
involved with the system. Conversely, as one ascends in the structure, 
more meaning is given to the lower levels. Through this view of reality, 
opposite forces which become threatening in the other scenarios are, in 
the third scenario, perceived as 11 ••• the emerging force of a forward 
thrust 11 (Jantsch, 1975, p. 99). Consequently, the oscillation between 
the forces becomes part of the evolutionary process. Hence, reality is 
not stagnant, but is ever changing. Where the mythological reality still 
possesses an element of a measurable reality through adaptation (adapta-
tion between observer and stream), the third concept or picture is never 
measurable, for it is in a constant state of change. Therefore, it is 
perceived as evolving, with the observer being an integral part of the 
evolutionary process. 
This illustration or metaphor of an individual and a stream helps 
one to visualize the options that are available to society in understand-
ing the role or relationship that exists between the observers and their 
environment. The relationship, in each case, portrays a different 
reality. Reality moves from being a separate entity to be observed and 
actualized, to one that cannot be understood or defined separate from the 
observer. The observed runs the gamut from objective to subjective, from 
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unemotional to emotional, and from a controlling/ordering force to one 
that has only one element that contributes to control/order. 
Conclusion 
The paradigms that are held by a society have tremendous effect upon 
the individual members of that society. Given the definition of the word 
11 paradigm, 11 as explained in Chapter I (Kuhn, 1970b; Capra, 1988), it is 
indicated that the theories, images, and beliefs/values held by a culture 
have tremendous influence upon the destiny of the individual members. 
Therefore, one must, when attempting to understand reality, consider how 
a society or culture views reality, including the language used to de-
scribe that reality. Social scientists have described Americans as 
having 
••• a deep desire for autonomy and self-reliance. We are a 
nation founded in independence. Separateness is a cultural 
norm for us. Our heroes are lonesome cowboys and hard-boiled 
detectives who work by themselves. Our economic system is 
based on individual enterprise, entrepreneurship, and competi-
tion (Tye, 1990, p. 1). 
When analyzing this description of American society in reference to 
paradigms, one begins to comprehend the forces that have existed to shape 
this independent and self-sufficient society. The industrial era has 
created a reality and thus an understanding of human life that appears to 
be diminishing in validity. Markley (1976) identified three premises of 
society which seemingly have been taken for granted, yet are now appear-
ing to be obsolete. They include: 
1. Human progress is synonymous with economic growth and an 
increasing consumption--a notion now challenged by short-
ages of various key resources and increased pollution. 
2. Mankind is conceptually separated from nature and it is the 
human desire to conquer and exploit nature--an attitude at 
distinct variance with modern understandings of ecology. 
3. Economic efficiency, specialization, and scientific reduc-
tionism are the most trustworthy approaches to fulfillment 
of human goals--concepts that have raised our standards of 
living, but are dehumanizing our way of life (p. 223). 
65 
Kuhn (1970b) pointed out that a characteristic of anomalies is their 
persistent refusal to fit into the existing paradigm. Therefore, these 
irregularities will lead to the discovery of new theories that attempt to 
answer the anomalies. The mere fact that these premises identified by 
Markley are no longer describing human existence with any degree of accu-
racy results in anomalies within the dominant paradigm of society. 
Just as anomalies are an inevitable ingredient of a paradigm, so too 
is the ability to interpret a paradigm, for it is through interpretation 
that a paradigm is articulated within a given society (Kuhn 1970b). As 
shown earlier in this chapter, we interpret or understand new experiences 
in light of past experiences. Yet, when we move into a new paradigm, we 
cannot logically transfer complete understanding of past experiences of 
the old paradigm over into the new, for words change meaning from one 
paradigm to another (Kuhn, 1970a). Kuhn described this incompatibility 
of paradigms as being incommensurable. He stressed that once a transla-
tion is made concerning the meaning of the word, inevitably there will be 
compromises between the original meaning and what is possibly acceptable. 
Bohr•s difficulty in comprehending the wave-particle duality (see Chapter 
III) illustrates this concept of incommensurable theories or paradigms. 
He found himself torn between the terminology and concepts of classical 
science and the characteristics of quantum mechanics. When Bohr applied 
the terminology and concepts of classical mechanics to quantum mechanics, 
he found that the terminology and concepts were no longer valid. 
This illustrates a major problem with language, which was addressed 
by Whitehead (1929), that being the need for a new or redesigned language 
66 
that more accurately describes the emerging reality associated with a new 
paradigm. If language is not molded on reality, then any attempt to 
describe reality with ordinary language will, to some degree, distort 
that reality. This assumption relies on the premise that society can 
somehow comprehend the character of nature apart from the 1 anguage and 
then identify the areas in which language and reality do not correspond. 
To correct this problem, society must seek new terminology which more 
accurately describes the relationship between human beings and their 
environment. 
Markley (1976} identified some characteristics of human beings which 
are creating a new image of the human being in this evolving paradigm. 
Though not a complete list, it includes visualizing humans as: 
1. entailing an ecological ethic, emphasizing the total commu-
nity of life and the oneness of the human race; 
2. embracing a self-realization ethic, placing the highest 
value on development of the individual; 
3. conveying a holistic sense-of-perspective of life; 
4. balancing and coordinating satisfactions along many dimen-
sions rather than over-emphasize[ing] those associated with 
status and consumption; 
5. experimental and open-ended, rather than ideological dog-
matic (p. 225). 
This list, though only partial in scope, describes a humanity that 
is not separate from its environment, but rather is intertwined and in-
terrelated with the components of the environment. Thus, to define 
either the environment or the individual as separate, independent en-
tities becomes an impossibility. To fully understand or comprehend the 
environment requires comprehension of the other individual, yet, to 
identify characteristics of either requires that the moment in a specific 
space at a given time be 11 frozen. 11 This attempt to gather knowledge thus 
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interrupts the continual process of changing and emerging identities. As 
Heisenburg and Bohr found it impossible to fully understand reality in a 
changing and evolving environment at the subatomic level, so too is it 
difficult to comprehend fully reality when dealing with the human race. 
One must also understand that the language currently being utilized 
to express, describe, and communicate this new, emerging reality reflects 
the values and definitions of an 11 0ld paradigm11 ; thus, it no longer can 
be used to describe accurately what is transpiring in the new paradigm. 
In the scientific community it has become quite obvious that the language 
being used to describe natural phenomena is totally inadequate, therefore 
diminishing to some degree the accuracy of description. Yet, for human 
comprehension, some familiar terminology is required. As stated by 
Rogers (cited in Friedman and Donley, 1985, p. 64), 11 Where the new cloth 
meets the old cloth, they must agree. 11 
If this is true in the world of science, so too is it true in the 
world that includes human beings. However, progress must be made in 
bringing about not only a better understanding of the identity of humans, 
but also their relationship with their environment, including new termi-
nology that accurately describes the process of an emerging and continu-
ally changing human reality. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF THE COPENHAGEN 
INTERPRETATION FOR CURRICULUM 
THEORIZING 
Summary of Study 
As shown in Chapter II, the classical scientific paradigm has pro-
vided the knowledge base from which twentieth century curricul urn theo-
rists have developed curriculum theory. The knowledge base that has been 
borrowed from the scientific community contained several important prem-
ises that must be identified before one can hope to comprehend the 
resulting reality. These premises include an objective reality, deter-
minism, the principle of causality, and reductionism. 
Given these premises, the universe and the environment were assumed 
to be separate entities; therefore, natural phenomenon could be viewed in 
their entirety by the observer. The role of the observer was primarily 
to understand the principles of nature. In an effort to understand these 
principles, classical scientists realized that through reductionism and 
causality, a whole entity could be understood by identifying its rudi-
mentary parts and their corresponding relationships. Therefore, the 
principles of causality and determinism allowed scientists to make pre-




Si nee the theories of cl assi cal science could provide acceptable 
answers to society concerning nature and the universe, society began to 
accept the premises from which scientists derived these theories. Cur-
riculum theorists followed suit, and thus began viewing curriculum theory 
within the same constructs of science. Consequently, curriculum theo-
rists perceived the child and curriculum as two separate entities, and 
correspondingly, education became no more than the sum of its parts. As 
witnessed in science, curriculum theorists began identifying those parts 
and their causal relationships; hence, educators could structure the 
entire educational experience in an orderly and predictable fashion. 
In as much as classical science has provided the foundation of twen-
tieth century curriculum theory, does it not hold true that a new para-
digm in science holds the potential for an alternative for curriculum 
theorizing? The Copenhagen Interpretation has subsequently challenged 
the basic principles of classical science. This new scientific paradigm 
is founded upon new premises concerning nature; therefore, new scientific 
methods are required if science is to comprehend what it is now able to 
observe at the atomic and subatomic 1 eve 1 s. These new methods and re-
sulting theories have forced scientists to rewrite the definition of 
reality. No longer is nature perceived as a separate entity, but rather 
nature and the observer are intertwined and interrelated. To understand 
nature requires understanding its relationship to the observer. The 
question then begins to emerge as to whether or not any entity has an 
independent identity outside of its relationship to the various forces 
within a given system. 
The principle of uncertainty and the principle of complimentarity 
seem to offer insight into these questions that scientists began asking 
in terms of quantum mechanics. In search of answers to these questions, 
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scientists began to change the focus of their questions, accepting that 
there were no absolutes and acknowledging the value of each entity that 
comprised a system. Thus, a new reality emerged. 
The thesis of this paper was to determine if the Copenhagen Inter-
pretation could provide an alternative framework for curriculum theory. 
Could the premises and methods used to describe the new reality in sci-
ence have any value for curriculum theorists? If history holds true, 
this author feels that the fundamental ideas of the Copenhagen Interpre-
tation do provide a new way of defining the educational process, the 
roles and relationships between the students and teachers, and the total 
design of curriculum theory. 
Reality and Curriculum Theory 
The scientific methods used by Heisenburg and Bohr reflected the 
premises that they embraced concerning nature. They discovered that 
reductionism was no longer relevant at the quantum level (see Chapter 
III). Because particles exhibited random characteristics, scientists 
could not hope to understand a system by comprehending its individual 
parts. 
As was shown in Chapter II, educators have also attempted to break 
down, categorize, and label children according to their exhibited abili-
ties. Not only are students divided into groups according to this abil-
ity, but schools then attach "descriptive" 1 abel s to them, such as 
"gifted," "regular," "learning disabled," and "emotionally handicapped," 
to name only a few. By dividing students into specific groups, educators 
are attempting to divide the student body into the elemental parts that 
comprise the whole for the sake of order. Identifying labels are then 
necessary to distinguish between the many and varied groups. 
71 
The problem arises in that the descriptive labels carry with them 
predetermined concepts as to how a student will perform in class. Not 
only does it describe how a student has performed or will perform, it 
also prescribes the type of teaching strategy and curriculum used with 
the student. For example, a child who has been identified as learning 
disabled will be taught concepts that are not as complex as those taught 
to children who are identified as gifted. Whereas gifted students are 
expected to be able to comprehend complex concepts, the same expectations 
are not held for the learning disabled student because of their identi-
fied disability. As a result, many times these students are never ex-
posed to the more complex concepts, or they are presented in a 11 watered 
down 11 fashion. In retrospect, 11 labeling 11 was the result of an effort to 
provide a quality education for the many different children who enter the 
schools. However, in an effort to help children achieve their individual 
potential, it required that schools identify or label according to their 
strengths and/or weaknesses. 
This illustrates the language deficiency in education that Whitehead 
(1929) identified, that being the inadequacy of language to describe 
actual entities (see Chapter IV). The question arises, 11 Just what is a 
•learning disabled• student, or what is a •gifted• student? 11 Many educa-
tors possibly would respond by stating that learning disabled students 
are ones possessing a certain deficiency in the manner in which they 
learn; whereas, gifted students demonstrate certain abilities which allow 
them to excel in certain areas. In many cases, if questioned further 
regarding how it was determined that a child is either 11 learning dis-
abled11 or 11 gifted, 11 a major indicator would be a child 1 S performance on a 
specific test. Therefore, through testing or a specific measurement, 
children are categorized according to their characteristic abilities and 
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then are tagged with a descriptive label which denotes their specific 
place in school. 
This author feels that education is experiencing the same problems 
that Bohr experienced in describing the electron. When utilizing common 
language to describe subatomic activities, Bohr could only describe char-
acteristic features rather than actual entities. He was able to identify 
the distinguishing characteristics of particles such as mass, charge, and 
appropriate effect, but nothing existed that corresponded exactly to 
Bohr•s description. The same is true in education. Students are identi-
fied and labeled according to characteristics that are demonstrated at a 
specific time, yet does that descriptive label accurately describe the 
whole child? 
The total design of schools also reflect this inadequacy of lan-
guage. Schools are divided according to specific grades; for example, 
first grade, second grade, third grade, etc. The question is, however, 
what is 11 third grade? 11 There is no concrete entity that is third grade; 
however, one can describe the characteristics of third grade. It nor-
mally represents a child of a specific age range who is taught certain 
math skills, along with specific language skills, science skills, and 
social studies skills. What skills are taught are usually built upon the 
skills that were taught in the 11 second 11 grade. But to say 11 this is third 
grade, 11 or 11 there is a third grader, 11 is only to describe certain prede-
termined characteristics. Yet, the educational system is so designed 
that children fail third grade, something that in actuality does not 
exist except for the convenience and organization of the educational 
system, which (as stated in Chapter III) was the purpose of scientific 
descriptors. 
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Language has always been society•s way of communicating, both indi-
vidually and collectively, for through the commonality of words and cor-
responding definitions people have been able to describe encounters, 
express thoughts, and communicate ideals. The problem, however, is that 
the language used is, in many cases, only able to describe characteris-
tics rather than discrete facts. Scientists such as Heisenburg and Bohr 
found in the scientific world that common language could only describe 
the results of experiments; consequently, the language utilized could 
only be used as a 11 ••• complementary mode of description 11 (Holton, 
1973, p. 118). However, in society, 11 Language which is intended to ex-
plain or describe reality [often times] becomes reality 11 {Dobson and 
Dobson, n.d., p. 4). 
When one considers experiences and the language used to describe 
those experiences in the context of curriculum, one begins to understand 
the impact of science and society in creating the reality that has for 
years been experienced by students. One then must ponder the effect upon 
the individual student, of not only the experiences that are encountered 
in school, but also of the language used to describe those experiences. 
When reflecting upon Whitehead • s description of the creation of 
knowledge and thus reality, one realizes the importance of experiences. 
As stated in Chapter IV, once a person encounters an experience, he or 
she instantly interprets that experience in 1 i ght of past experiences. 
If this is true, the experiences that a child encounters in school are 
helping to build or create knowledge held by that child. Whether it be 
through the process of 1 abe 1 i ng, ability tracking, or the pi ecemea 1 
method of curriculum, all are helping to construct a child 1 s perception, 
not only of himself or herself, but also of the environment in which they 
interact. Thus, each experience provides the framework from which future 
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experiences will be reacted to and interpreted. This is what Whitehead 
identified as perception and consciousness. Therefore, when students 
experience failure or the effects of labeling, it contributes to their 
consciousness, which transcends into the knowledge that they have not 
been able to succeed or are identified by some peculiar label. Hence-
forth, their reactions to future experiences will be reflective of those 
past experiences or encounters in school. If one acknowledges the role 
of experiences in creating knowledge, one must consider the experiences 
had by a child in the 11 reality 11 of school. 
Jantsch 1 s ( 1975) metaphor of the stream and independent observer 
gives insight into three general, yet unique, approaches to reality (see 
Chapter IV). Each scenario requires that the observer assume a different 
role in relation to the stream, consequently altering the value of the 
observer in each. This author feels that since schools are still func-
tioning within the parameters of the classical paradigm, the current 
rea 1 ity in schoo 1 s (and curri cu 1 urn theory) can be described by ana 1 ogy 
with the first and second pictures that Jantsch 1s metaphor employed. 
In the first scene, the observer is on the bank being an objective 
observer, and is able to view, measure, and describe the specific fea-
tures of the stream. The observer has no control over the stream and 
neither does the observer 1 s presence effect the stream. They are two 
separate entities. In considering curriculum, there has been a predeter-
mined body of information deemed by society to be important. According 
to the structure of schools, the information is broken down into sim-
plistic terms and is presented in piecemeal fashion according to grade 
levels. Consequently, a child in a specific grade will be taught skills 
regardless of ability and/or interest because it has been accepted in 
education that age level determines the ability to comprehend. 
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Therefore, children should not be taught whole concepts, but rather in 
building block fashion information is dispensed until a child is old 
enough (whatever age that may be) to comprehend the complex whole. 
In an effort to organize this building process, educators have de-
veloped stated objectives which have been methodically sequenced, such 
that a child can be carefully maneuvered through the maze of objectives 
until he or she has successfully mastered the whole of knowledge. In 
most cases, the sequenced objectives span several grade levels. Success 
of achievement is determined through testing or some other method of 
measurement, and there seems to be no interrelatedness between the stu-
dent and the information that is to be gained. The information deter-
mined to be important is a separate entity from the student, and the 
educational experience can be independently observed and measured. Just 
as an objective reality exists between the observer and the stream, so 
too is the student objectively viewing curriculum presented in school. 
The second scene described by Jantsch ( 1975) sees the observer in 
the stream. The observer•s own physical features, and weight and mass, 
affect the stream, but by compensating for the observer• s presence one 
can still understand the stream separate from the observer. Schools also 
attempt to compensate for the presence of children in the learning pro-
cess. By determining ability and attempting to teach towards the various 
learning styles, educators try to adjust the educational process accord-
ing to the needs and strengths presented by individual children, yet the 
learning process and the child continue to be separate entities. Learn-
ing is still measured, and if measured, requires something to measure 
against which reflects predetermined objectives. Just as illustrated in 
the first scene, the child is an observer of the learning process. 
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Both scenarios are products of the classical paradigm. For curricu-
lum, the classical paradigm includes the reduction of information into 
simple facts which will be presented in specific grade levels, and as 
students progress through grades, they will add to their previously 
1 earned facts. The information is something to be acquired by the 
learner and the success with lrihich one acquires that information will be 
predetermined by what educators deem successful. 
Admittedly, there are always new trends in curriculum that attempt 
to improve or revolutionize education. These have ranged from open 
schools to individualized instruction, to stated learner outcomes, to 
only name a few. Each has attempted to provide new approaches to learn-
ing which will result in higher student achievement. However, if one 
identifies the premises on which these new methods are founded, one finds 
they are just another model (which is what Tyler, 1949 provided) for 
teachers to imitate. For by following specific steps or procedures, 
teachers will, in turn, be able to help students experience success in 
the learning environment. Learning once again becomes objective, and 
thus a separate entity from the child with the teacher directing the 
learning experience through specified rituals. These various attempts at 
revolution, regardless of how they may differ in methods or style, all 
share a common conceptual base of education. 
The conceptual base for education under the 11 Classical paradigm 11 is 
very reflective of Newtonian science. Every component of education, 
whether it is curriculum, school structure, or the student body, is bro-
ken down, identified descriptively, and observed objectively. Just as 
Newton observed that the universe followed mechanical laws, reality in 
schools can also be described as mechanical. It is orderly, determinis-
tic, and predictable, much like the workings of a clock. 
The Potential of the Copenhagen Interpretation 
for Curriculum Theory 
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This author feels that the Copenhagen Interpretation does provide an 
alternative conceptual base for reinterpreting the schooling process. If 
so, consideration must be given to the premises, methods, and theories 
used by Heisenburg and Bohr in arriving at this interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. 
The epistemological approach from which Heisenburg and Bohr func-
tioned has been identified as logical positivism. This philosophy allows 
one to assert truth in logically opposing models. For example, it is 
acceptable to assume that the 11 particle 11 characteristic of an electron is 
true for a specific time. However, it is also true to state that the 
electron exhibits a 11Wave 11 characteristic at another point in time. 
Given this epistemological point of view, it is assumed that either defi-
nition of an electron is true and that the current description is all 
that can be said about the entity at that specific time. This knowledge 
base embraced by Heisenburg and Bohr allowed them to introduce into the 
field of science both subjectiveness and free will. 
This author feels that this approach brings an element of freedom 
into curriculum theory. Educators should not be required to make deci-
sions concerning students or even curriculum that then become 11 cast in 
stone... Decisions that are made as to what will be taught or how it will 
be taught should be viewed as being appropriate for a given time. Yet, 
educators should have the freedom to change these decisions if and when 
circumstances at another time warrant the change. For example, a teacher 
may decide to present a specific unit one year because various students 
demonstrate a sincere interest in the topic. The following year, 
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however, the next group of students may have absolutely no interest at 
all in that topic, yet may show interest in another area. Therefore, the 
teacher should be allowed to develop curriculum as the needs and inter-
ests of the students present themselves. This flexibility can even be 
applied to the every day lessons that are taught in individual classes. 
The methods used with one group of students quite possibly will not work 
with another group of students, given the personalities and atmospheres 
of individual classes. The author does not mean to imply that curriculum 
should have no order or consistency. Most people will agree that stu-
dents need a basic understanding of such things as English, math, sci-
ence, and hi story; however, for the curricul urn to be prescribed by an 
outside entity such that the teacher cannot allow students to pursue 
their own knowledge, curriculum becomes a restrictive rather than an 
enlightening force. 
This philosophical attitude not only provides greater flexibility 
for the teacher but also widens the door of opportunity for students. 
Students of all ages, and especially adolescents, are very volatile as a 
result of their biological changes. Students• abilities to perform will 
vary from day-to-day; their interest will vary and their goals will 
change. As long as students are allowed to function according to who 
they are without the schools determining who they are according to pre-
meditated standards, students will have the opportunity to grow, experi-
ence, and develop their own abilities and reach their fullest potential 
without being confined by the technicalities of school. This episte-
mological foundation thus allows enormous freedom in curriculum and the 
individual child becomes a guiding force in the educational process. 
The principle of complimentarity also offers an alternative way of 
viewing the child in the classroom. A child that sits at a desk assumes 
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the role of a student, yet that child has many other characteristics that 
contribute to the total identity of the child. Not only is that child a 
student, but when they go home they become part of a family unit in which 
they assume new characteristics. They may become the primary interpreter 
for parents who cannot speak Eng 1 ish, or they may have to contribute 
significantly to the family income. In today•s society, many children 
are part of a single-parent family and, if there are younger siblings, 
the child may have to assume the role of parent. As illustrated by the 
concept of complimentarity, to fully understand the child in the class-
room requires that consideration be given to the other qualities and/or 
circumstances that are exhibited or experienced outside the classroom. 
It is also important to realize that a change in any one of the 
above mentioned characteristics will probably affect the other character-
istics in one way or another. Many times a divorce in the home will 
affect the student in the classroom. Conversely, students experiencing 
difficulty in the classroom can, in turn, begin to cause problems at 
home. Bohr concluded that his knowledge of an electron rested upon 
knowledge of the qualities of the electron (position and velocity). 
Educators must come to this same realization when working with children: 
the more information known about the whole child, the more the teacher 
will be able to understand the reality from which each individual child 
emerges. 
If the concept of complimentarity is applicable to curriculum, con-
sideration must be given to the concept of balance. Students must be 
allowed to achieve a balance within their various qualities if they are 
to achieve their fullest potential. This must be recognized not only by 
educators but also by parents. Some students are so motivated to achieve 
(whether internally or from an outside force) in athletics, in academics, 
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or socially, to the extent that their other qualities (including the 
ability to be a child) are, in turn, forced aside. In some fashion, 
children must be allowed to nurture all of their various qualities, at 
the sacrifice of none. This is not to say that at times a child will not 
focus on one area of his or her life more than another, it simply means 
that in the whole of who a child is, they must be encouraged and provided 
the opportunity to explore life to its fullest. This balance in a 
child's world again illustrates a fundamental premise of complimentarity. 
Bohr found that the more he knew about the momentum of an electron, the 
less he understood the position. Hence, to achieve the fullest knowledge 
of the electron required a balance between both momentum and position. 
Not only does the principle of complimentarity offer insight into 
understanding the child, but the basis of Bohr's (1987) defense of the 
Copenhagen Interpretation offers new alternatives for curriculum theo-
rists. Bohr was convinced that science could never hope to comprehend 
fully an observed system due to quantum reaction. Therefore, he was 
forced to accept statistical descriptions of possible characteristics. 
Bohr also discovered that once a measuring instrument was introduced into 
the system, the motion of the particles altered. As a result, reality 
was in a constant state of change and was continually emerging. Bohr 
concluded that the attempt to isolate a measurement resulted in the dis-
ruption of the continuum of motion. 
If this finding offers any insight into curriculum theory, one must 
reevaluate the concept of education. Is education a "stagnant" experi-
ence, or is it an ongoing and emerging process? If it is an ongoing 
process, then to try to measure or test a student's progress or learning 
attempts to isolate a specific point in the learning continuum. Conse-
quently testing only shows a small part of an ongoing process and thus 
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alters the total picture. Just as the measurement for velocity altered 
the knowledge of the position of an electron, so too does measuring or 
testing alter the whole view of the educational process. 
In order to gain access into the atomic and subatomic world, scien-
tists were subsequently required to sacrifice the ability to visualize 
reality fully. Consequently, scientists were forced to rely upon 
intuition in their search for understanding and the ultimate particles of 
nature. Once intuition enabled scientists to grasp the concept mentally, 
mathematics provided the verification. 
This author proposes that intuition is a vital part of curriculum 
theory; this can be verified in light of the Copenhagen Interpretation. 
Intuition liberates a teacher from mandated methods, learning objectives, 
and even teaching models that are considered in 11 Vogue. 11 Through intui-
tion, a teacher is able to become part of the emerging and continually 
changing learning process of education. It thereby allows the teacher to 
assist students individually and collectively according to the needs and 
desires of the students. However, for teachers to depend upon intuition 
and be successful, they must be sensitive to the various realities that 
children bring with them into the classroom. 
This author feels that the Copenhagen Interpretation has the poten-
tial to force curriculum, or allow curriculum, to move into Jantsch•s 
(1975) third scenario of reality. In the third setting, the stream and 
the observer become one. The observer cannot be separated from the 
stream; therefore, measurement becomes impossible. To understand the 
stream, one must understand the observer, and to understand the observer 
requires understanding of the stream. There are no separate entities 
that exist outside of their relationship to the whole; therefore, knowl-
edge is not 11 0ut there to be acquired, 11 but rather is ongoing and 
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emerging, with the individual child being an active participant in the 
learning process. 
If the stream can be compared to the learning experience, it neces-
sitates an understanding of the individual child {observer). Children 
bring with them a whole baggage of experiences outside of school that 
contributes to the total child. These experiences range from ethnic and 
economic backgrounds to religious beliefs and moral upbringing. If past 
experiences determine future interpretation of experiences, a teacher 
cannot expect to dispense information to a child and then anticipate the 
child's reaction to that information. A child's reaction to the learning 
process is reflective of all the collective experiences of that individ-
ual. Consequently, it will be impossible for a teacher to comprehend 
fully the reality that the child brings into the classroom. Therefore, 
the child and the learning experience cannot be separated, but are fused 
together as one entity. The role of the teacher will become that of a 
resource person pro vi ding assistance to children as they seek to guide 
their own learning. 
Again, the author does not mean to give the impression that future 
curriculum can have no structure or method of determining growth--only 
that the search for knowledge will be a cooperative effort between the 
student and the teacher. The student wi 11 be a 11 owed to pursue his or 
her own interests at a self-determined level of ability, and with the 
cooperation of the teacher, can explore new areas of knowledge. If eval-
uation is necessary, then it must be from the unique perspective of the 
child, for only the child can assess feelings of achievement. 
In this type of cooperative learning environment, structure and 
order wi 11 come from within the system, rather than mandated from an 
outside force. Structure and order will emerge as is needed within the 
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classroom at a given time. If systems organize themselves according to 
their purpose {see Chapter IV), the classroom and curriculum will be 
organized according to the needs of the students rather than the bureau-
cratic needs of the administration, state department of education, or 
legislature. 
Does one ever question why classes are divided into 55-minute seg-
ments, or why history is taught at a particular time and literature at 
another? In most cases, the decisions are made to accommodate the time 
that has been allotted by the community or dictated by the local board of 
education. Some of the factors that enter into these decisions include 
bus schedules, athletics, or band--to identify only a few. Whatever the 
reason may be, decisions are many times made with the needs or desires of 
the students being of last priority. 
As a possible alternative to this segmented structure, consider the 
possibility of teaching certain subjects together. Much literature could 
be learned in the study of history, or mathematical principles in the 
study of science. By taking a wholistic approach to curriculum, students 
are instantly able to perceive the relevance of subjects which, in turn, 
can open new doors of knowledge for them to investigate. 
If one looks to the Copenhagen Interpretation for possible alterna-
tives to curriculum theory, one finds that Heisenburg and Bohr were 
forced to relinquish their desire for 11 absolutes." The reality they 
witnessed was statistical, probabilistic, and appeared random. However, 
by gaining an understanding of the randomness of nature, Heisenburg and 
Bohr were able to restore order to their reality. 
The alternatives that this author has mentioned appear to introduce 
randomness into the field of curriculum. However, by understanding that 
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apparently chaotic and disorderly approach to curriculum, order is once 
again restored to the learning process. 
Conclusion 
The statement, 11 I once took the moon to be (or saw the moon as) a 
planet, but I was wrong 11 (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 115) illustrates what happens 
as a result of new knowledge or understanding. Once scientists expand 
their knowledge and begin to see the world in light of that knowledge, 
they describe it in terms of 11 ••• scales falling from their eyes or [a] 
lightning flash that inundates a previously obscure puzzle 11 (Kuhn, 1970b, 
p. 122). Can this same experience be translated into curriculum theory? 
This author feels the same is true for curriculum theorists. 
If the past sheds any light upon the future, the Copenhagen Inter-
pretation will undoubtedly affect society, including curriculum theory. 
Is this to say that what schools have been doing in the past century has 
been wrong? If so, one must say that Newton, one of the finest minds of 
all time, was wrong. One must realize that times change and societies 
change, and as in the field of science, knowledge is acquired in a piece-
meal fashion. Knowledge, which at one time seems to be reality, becomes 
the basis for further studies whose results will make the original knowl-
edge appear obsolete and, in time, mythical. The same is happening in 
the field of education. What has been the foundation of education no 
longer is serving its function, and therefore is leading into a new real-
ity in school, requiring a new language and new concepts to describe that 
reality. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Apple, M. W. {1975). Scientific Interests and the Nature of Educational 
Institutions. In: Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, W. 
Pinar, Ed. Berkeley, California: McCutchen, 120-130. 
Asimov, I. {1982). Asimov•s Biographical Encyclopedia of Science and 
Technology. (2nd rev. ed.) New York: Doubleday. 
Bell, E. T. (1937). Men of Mathematics. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Bixby, W. (1964). The Universe of Galilee and Newton. New York: Har-
per and Row. 
Blaedel, N. (1988). Harmony and Unity: The Life of Niels Bohr. Madi-
son, Wisconsin: Science Tech. 
Blythe, J. W. (1967). Whitehead•s Theory of Knowledge. New York: 
Kraus. 
Bobbitt, J. F. ( 1941). Curricul urn of Modern Education. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Bohr, N. (1963). Causality and Complementarity. The Philosophical 
Writings of Niels Bohr (vol. III). Woodbridge, Connecticut: Ox Box 
Press, 1-7, 79-100. 
Bohr, N. (1958). Discussions With Einstein on Epistemological Problems 
in Atomic Physics. The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr (vol. 
II). Woodbridge, Connecticut: Ox Box Press, 32-66. 
Bohr, N. (1987). The Structure of the Atom. Nobel Prize in Physics 
Award Address, 1922. In: The World of Physics (vol. II}, W. J. 
Hane, Ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 315-338. 
Bolton, L. (February, 1921). Relativity. Scientific American, 124, 
106-107. 
Boorse, H. A., Motz, L., and Weaver, J. H. {1989}. The Atomic Scien-
tists: A Biographical History. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Born, M. {1987). The Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 
Nobel Prize in Physics Award Address, 1954. In: The World of Phys-
ics, (vol. II), W. J. Hane, Ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 370-
378. 




Bridwell 5 R. (1986). Fidelia: My Voyage to a Distant Shore. New York: 
E. P. Dutton. 
Burtt 5 E. A. (1949). The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Calder! N. (1979). Einstein•s Universe. New York: Penguin Books. 
Capra! F. (1984). The Tao of Physics. New York: Bantam Books. 
Capra! F., Ed. (1988). Uncommon Wisdom. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Carroll, J. B05 Ed. (1956). Language! Thought and Reality: Selected 
Writings of Benjamin Lee Wharf. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Cohen! I. B. (December, 1955). Isaac Newton. Scientific American! 193, 
73-80. 
Crombie, A. E. (October, 1959). Descartes. Scientific American! 201! 
160-173. 
Dobson, R. L. and Dobson, J. E. (Spring, 1987). Curriculum Theorizing. 
Educational Forum, 51, 275-284. 
Dobson, R. L. and Dobson! J. E. (1981). The Language of Schooling. 
Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. 
Dobson, R. L. and Dobson, J. E. (n.d.). Toward an Alternative Research 
Paradigm for Small/Rural Schools Beyond an Approximated Reality. 
(Unpublished paper, Oklahoma State University, 1-21.) 
Doll, R. C. (1986). Curriculum Improvement: Decision Making and Pro-
cess. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Doll, W. E. (1989). Foundations For a Post-Modern Curriculum. Journal 
of Curriculum Studies, 21, 243-253. 
d1 Espagnat, B. (November 5 1979). The Quantum Theory and Reality. Sci-
entific American, 241, 158-181. 
Einstein, A. (1923). The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativ-
ity. In: The Principle of Relative! A. Sommerfield! Ed. New York: 
Dover Publications! 109-164. 
Einstein 5 A., Podolsky, B., and Rosen! N. (May, 1935). Can Quantum-
Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? 
Physical Review! 47 5 777-780. 
Fauvel, J. 5 Flood! R. 5 Shortland, M. 5 and Wilson, R., Eds. (1988). Let 
Newton Be! New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ferguson, M. (1980). Aguarian Conspiracy: Personal and Social Trans-
formation in the 1980•s. Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher. 
87 
Friedman, A. J. and Donley, C. C. (1985). Einstein: As Myth and Muse. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gjertsen, D. (1986). The Newton Handbook. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. 
Gleick, J. (1987). Chaos: Making a New Science. New York: Penguin 
Books. 
Gutting, G., Ed. (1980). Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and 
Applications of Thomas Kuhn • s Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
Haggerson, N. L. (Spring, 1988). Reconceptualizing Inquiry in Curricu-
lum: Using Multiple Research Paradigms to Enhance the Study of 
Curriculum. Journal of Curriculum Theory, §., 81-102. 
Hartshorne, C. and Peden, C. (1981). Whitehead 1 s View of Reality. New 
York: Pilgrim Press. 
Hawking, S. (1988). A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to 
Black Holes. New York: Bantam Books. 
Heisenburg, W. (1958). The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory. 
Physics and Philosophy, 19. New York: Harper and Row, 44-58. 
Heisenburg, W. (1987). The Development of Quantum Mechanics, Nobel 
Prize Physics Award Address, 1932. In: The World of Physics (val. 
II), W. J. Hane, Ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 356-367. 
Heisenburg, W. (1985). Reminiscences From 1925 Through 1927. In: 
Niels Bohr: A Centenary Volume, A. P. French and P. J. Kennedy, 
Eds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 163-171. 
Holton, G. (1973). Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to 
Einstein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Holzner, B. (1972). Reality Construction in Society. Cambridge: 
Schenkman. 
Jantsch, E. (1975). Design for Evolution: Self-Organization and Plan-
ning in the Life of Human Systems. New York: George Braziller. 
Jeans, J. H. (1946). Physics and Philosophy. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jones, R. V. (1985). Complementarity as a Way of Life. In: Niels 
Bohr: A Centenary Volume, A. P. French and P. J. Kennedy, Eds. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 320-324. 
Kl iebard, H. M. {1988). The Effort to Reconstruct the Modern American 
Curriculum. In: The Curriculum: Problems, Politics, and Possibil-
ities, L. E. Beyer and M. W. Apple, Eds. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 19-31. 
Kliebard, H. M. (1975). Reappraisal: The Tyler Rational. 
riculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, W. Pinar, Ed. 




Kuhn, T. (1970a). Incommensurability and Paradigms. In: Criticism and 
the Growth of Knowledge, I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Eds. London: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kuhn, T. {1970b). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Laszio, E. (1966). Beyond Skepticism and Realism. The Hague, Nether-
lands: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Leclerc, I., Ed. The Relevance of Whitehead. New York: Macmillan. 
Lowe, V. ( 1962). Understanding Whitehead. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press. 
MacKinnon, E. (1985). Bohr on the Foundations of Quantum Theory. In: 
Niels Bohr: A Centenary Volume, A. P. French and P. J. Kennedy, 
Eds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 101-120. 
Markley, 0. W. ( 1976). Human Consciousness in Transformation. In: 
Evolution and Consciousness: Human Systems in Transition, E. 
Jantsch and C. H. Waddington, Eds. Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley, 214-229. 
McGuire, J. E. and Tamny, M. (1983). Certain Philosophical Questions: 
Newton's Trinity Notebook. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Mermin, D. (April, 1985). Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks? Reality 
and the quantum theory. Physics Today, 38, 38-47. 
Miller, A. I. (1978). Visualization Lost and Regained: The Genesis of 
the Quantum Theory in the Period, 1913-1927. In: On Aesthetics in 
Science, J. Wechsler, Ed. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 73-102. 
Miller, J. P. and Seller, W. (1985). Curriculum: Perspective and Prac-
tice. New York: Longman. 
Monastersky, R. (August, 1988). Newton's Gravity Law May Take a Fall. 
Science News, 134, 85. 
Murdoch, D. (1987). Niel Bohr's Philosophy of Physics. Great Britain: 
University of Canterbury Press. 
New Concepts of the Past Century. (September, 1920). Scientific Ameri-
can, 123, 276-288. 
Newton, I. (1966). Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natura 1 Phi-
losophy and His System of the World, A. Motte, Translator. (Revised 
by Florian Cajorri.) Berkeley: University of California Press. 
89 
Oliver, D. (1989). Education, Modernity, and Fractured Meaning. Al-
bany: State University of New York Press. 
Ornstein, A. C. and Hankins, F. P. (1988). Curriculum Foundations: 
Principles and Issues. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall. 
Pagels, H. R. (1987). Bell 1 s Inequality. In: The World of Physics 
(vol. II), J. H. Weaver, Ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 470-
483. 
Pagels, H. R. (1988). The Dreams of Reasons: The Computer and the Rise 
of the Sciences of Complexity. New York: Bantam Books. 
Pais, A. (1982). •subtle is the Lord .•. • The Science and the Life of 
Albert Einstein. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Palmer, P. J. (September/October, 1987). The Way We Know and the Way We 
Live. Change Magazine, 16. 
Pankow, W. (1976). Openness as Self-Transcendence. In: Evolution and 
consciousness: Human Systems in Transition, E. Jantsch and C. H. 
Waddington, Eds. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 16-36. 
Planck, M. (1987). The Genesis and Present State of Development of the 
Quantum Theory, Nobel Prize in Physics Award Address, 1918. In: 
The World of Physics, W. J. Hane, Ed. New York: Simon and Schu-
ster, 284-292. 
Prigogine, I. (1976). Order Through Fluctuation: Self-Organization and 
Social System. In: Evolution and Consciousness: Human Systems in 
Transition, E. Jantsch and C. H. Waddington, Eds. Reading, Massa-
chusetts: Addison-Wesley, 93-126. 
Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers 
(vol 2). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rhodes, R. (1986). The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
Regis, E. (1987). Who Got Einstein• s Office? Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Ronan, C. A. (1982). Science: Its History and Development Among the 
World 1 s Cultures. New York: Hamlyn. 
Sachs, M. (1988). Einstein Versus Bohr. LaSalle, Illinois: Open 
Court. 
Schopan, A. E. (1989). The Wholistic World View: An Emerging Myth. 
Journal of Humanistic Education, 13, 9-14. 
Schwartz, P. and Ogilvy, J. (April, 1979). 
Changing Patterns of Thought and Belief. 
Values and Lifestyles Program.) Menlo 
International. 
90 
The Emergent Paradigm: 
(An Analytical Report, 
Park, California: SRI 
Schroedinger, E. (1987). The Fundamental Idea of Wave Mechanics, Nobel 
Prize in Physics Award Address, 1933. In: The World of Physics 
(vol. II), W. J. Hane, Ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 341-352. 
Soddy, F. (1987). Origins of the Conceptions of Isotopes, Nobel Price 
in Chemistry Award Address, 1921. In: The World of Physics (vol. 
II), W. J. Hanes, Ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 50-59. 
Stapp, H. P. (1972). The Copenhagen Interpretation. American Journal 
of Physics, 40, 1098-1116. 
Thomsen, D. (May, 1987). In the Beginning Was Quantum Mechanics. Sci-
ence News, 131, 346-347. 
Tye, K. A. (1990). Introduction: The World at a Crossroads. Global 
Education: From Thought to Action. Alexandria, Virginia: Associa-
tion for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
Tyler, R. W. (1949). Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Urban, W. M. (November, 1928). Elements of Unintelligibility in White-
head•s Metaphysics. Journal of Philosophy, 35, 617-637. 
Weaver, J. H. (1987). Introduction. The Copenhagen Interpretation of 
Quantum Theory. The World of Physics (vol. II). New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 397-399. 
Weisburd, S. (July, 1987). Celebrating Newton. Science News, 132, 11-
13. 
Westfall, R. S. (1980). Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton. 
London: Cambridge University Press. 
Whitehead, A. N. (1935). Adventures of Ideas. New York: Macmillan. 
Whitehead, A. N. (1938). Modes of Thought. New York: Macmillan. 
Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan. 





Patricia A. Trusty 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Education 
Thesis: THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR 
CURRICULUM THEORIZING 
Major Field: Curriculum and Instruction 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Bishop, California, December 15, 1954, the 
daughter of Joseph J. and Georgia M. Stanfield; happily married 
to Michael N. Trusty. 
Education: Graduated from Springdale High School, Springdale, 
Arkansas in 1973; received Bachelor of Arts degree in history 
from Arkansas Tech University in 1977; received Master of Edu-
cation degree in Special Education from University of Arkansas 
in 1980; completed requirements for the Doctor of Education 
degree at Oklahoma State University in May, 1991. 
Professional Experience: Social Studies Teacher, Springdale Public 
Schools, Springdale, Arkansas, 1977-81; Social Studies Teacher, 
Byng Public Schools, Ada, Oklahoma, 1981-82; Social Studies 
Teacher, Broken Arrow Public Schools, 1982 to present; Depart-
ment Chairman, 1983 to present; Gifted Coordinator, 1985 to 
present, all at Broken Arrow Public Schools, Broken Arrow, 
Oklahoma. 
Professional Organizations: Phi Delta Kappa; Association for Super-
vision and Curriculum Development. 
Recognitions: Outstanding Social Studies Teacher Award (second 
place winner), Tulsa County (awarded by Daughters of the Ameri-
can Revolution), 1985; Outstanding Social Studies Teacher for 
State of Oklahoma (awarded by Daughters of the American Revolu-
tion), 1986. 
